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4.1. The significance of paradiplomacy of the Russian 
Far East
Centre – regional relations are still present in academic and political 
discourse in contemporary Russia, which is a puzzle taking into the account 
how the idea of federalism has been devastated in practical terms, over the 
past 16 years. After seizing political power at the beginning of the 2000s 
Vladimir Putin and his associates effectively centralized the political system 
and simultaneously centre – regional relations. The pendulum swung 
from spontaneous and uncontrolled decentralization under Boris Yeltsin’s 
final years of rule, exceeding the former extreme of centralization, toward 
a unitary-like model, better corresponding with the new mode of Russian 
politics – electoral authoritarianism (Petrov 2000, 1; Golosov 2011, 624). 
Compared with the 1990s, the international activity of Russian regions 
is less spectacular nowadays, because of the increased centralization of the 
federal relations system and due to this, developing electoral consolidation 
of authoritarianism in Russia (Kuznetsov 2009). It does not develop rapidly 
and, what is the most important, it does not provide high tension with the 
federal centre. The regional authorities in legal and political areas have 
been subordinated to the centre which has resulted in the centralization 
of regional international cooperation. The Kremlin has now undoubtedly 
more to say than in the 1990s about a region’s interaction with their 
foreign partners. 
The problem of international activity of federal subjects (regions) of 
the Russian Federation since 1999, which marks the decline of the Boris 
Yeltsin presidency, significantly lost on its attractiveness in the political 
scientists community working on modern Russia. However, it does not 
mean that since 1999 there have been no interesting works in this research 
area in Russia (Busygina and Lebedeva 2008; Plotnikova 2005), in the 
Western world, and in Poland (Raś 2013; Rychlik 2014). The problem 
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of the  international activity of federal subjects (regions) of the Russian 
Federation is analysed in: the legal institutionalization phenomenon 
(Busygina and Lebedeva 2008); the evolution of classical diplomacy 
of state and change of function of diplomacy as the exclusive tool in 
international relations, which means the loss of monopoly in the area of 
foreign policy by the state (Plotnikova 2005); and the transformation of the 
idea of federalism in modern Russia and the tension in the centre-regions 
relations, which regional paradiplomacy was an excerpt (Zacharow 2008). 
We can also distinguish work concerning the formation of the identities 
of regional elites, having wider room to manoeuvre in domestic policy as 
a result of the international activity of the regions that are subordinated 
to them (Chirikova and Lapina 2001). Furthermore, we can add those 
putting the “Russian case” in the broader context, i.e. analysing the 
influence of globalization and regionalization processes on Russia and 
consequences of regional internationalization from the Russian foreign 
and security policies perspective (Perović 2000). However, it is problematic 
to compare the publications in this research area that are related to the 
Yeltsin presidency to these dealing with issues of the regional international 
cooperation during the Vladimir Putin era (Chirikova and Lapina 2001; 
Perović 2000 Makarychev 2000).
Nevertheless, the authors, reporting a fall of interest in international 
activity of the Russian regions, emphasize that “even under the Putin 
regime paradiplomacy is still important for both subnational units and 
Moscow’s foreign policy, even though it has become more routine and less 
publicized” (Sergunin and Joenniemi 2014, 19). 
Despite the decrease in interest, the authors maintain that the 
internationalization phenomenon of the Russian regions does not lose 
a practical significance from both the shape of the centre-regions relations 
and the possibility of promotion by the federal centre of Russian affairs 
in the international arena. The Far East macro-region has proven to be 
particularly important, and is given more attention due to its geopolitical 
situation and changing political environment in Russia (Kurilla 2007; 
Hale and Kurilla 2011; Karaganov et al. 2015), as well as in Poland (Lubina 
2014; Madej 2015).
The analysis of paradiplomacy in modern Russia, which is implemented 
on the case of the Far East regions, is justified at least for several reasons. 
First and foremost, the Russian Far East is a macro-region that is marked by 
negative trends due to socio-economic development. Therefore, the Russian 
federal elites look on it with special concern. Put simply, the Far East macro-
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region has “always” figured prominently in the federal centre’s regional policy. 
Up till now, it was due to the negative conditions (persistently the worsening 
social-economic condition of the Far East). However, since 2012, especially 
after 2014 (Russia – the Western world conflict) the macro-region has been 
given a new positive role in the “turn to the East” policy (razvorot na Vostok).
The Far East has to play a double important role. First of all, it has 
to modernize through the attraction of domestic and foreign investment 
without exposing the federal budget to additional costs. Secondly, it has to 
become the Russian “window on the East” – to integrate Russia with the 
Asia-Pacific countries.
Considering its strategic situation, structural problems and changed 
international situation the Russian Far East became part of a geopolitical 
regional policy model, near to the North Caucasus and Crimea. This 
model of regional policy is interpreted as: a mechanism that is supposed 
to preserve territorial integrity of the state and strengthen control over 
regions that are strategically important (Zubarevich 2015, 1–2).
The authors set themselves a goal to present in this chapter the 
development of paradiplomacy in the Far East macro-region on the All-
Russian trends in this area. First and foremost, the authors will try to prove 
similarities and differences relating to the evolution of paradiplomacy on 
a macro-All-Russian and a micro-Far Eastern scale between two political 
eras in contemporary Russian history, associated with Boris Yeltsin (1991–
1999) and Vladimir Putin (2000–2016).
The analysis of paradiplomacy should provide especially additional 
information about the federal centre perception of paradiplomacy, the 
centre-regions relations model in regard to regional internationalization 
and its consequences.
4.2. Research method and chapter structure
This chapter relies on the fact that Alexander Kusnetsov’s research 
model is relevant and useful with reference to paradiplomacy in Russia 
(Kusnetsov 2015, 116), but it does not mean that the Russian specificity 
“will not leave an imprint on” Kusnetsov’s theoretical arrangements.
The authors also adopt that the established research goals will become 
fully realized on the basis of the “problematic-geographical” method with 
use of comparative literature elements. As a result, this chapter consists 
of two major parts: 1. All-Russia and 2. Far East.
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The All-Russian part encompasses following issues:
• the general characterization of the evolution of federal relations 
(federalism) in Russia since 1990; 
• the problem of legal-constitutional strengthening of international 
activity; 
• taking up the subject of premises and the forms of commitment of 
Russian regions in international cooperation; 
• the issue of the differentiation of level of the regional 
internationalization; 
• the evolution of federal elites relations to the paradiplomacy issue 
from the Russian state perspective; 
• the attempt to determine what is the centre-regions model in Russia 
with reference to international activity of these last.
The Far East part includes the parts about: 
• the evolution of the federal centre policy towards it (with special 
regard to the “turn to the East” policy in Russian foreign policy); 
• the analysis of the regional internationalization of the Russian Far 
East (using the regional internationalization index); 
• profile of international activity of the most internationalized 
regions and its institutionalization; using macro-region as a means to an 
end by federal centre for implementation of determined goals in foreign 
policy and the perception of centre – macro-region relations by regional 
administration and academic elite representatives.
Chapter includes also the results of deepen interview with 
representatives of local administrative and academic elites, concerning 
the perception of paradiplomacy (international activity) in macro-region 
of the Far East. 
4.3. The evolution of federal relations in Russia
Institutionalizing the international activity of Russia’s federal 
subjects and the federal government between 1991–2015 is an interesting 
conundrum. This process is in actual fact strongly tied to the evolution of 
federalism in Russian, namely the transformations that are taking place 
within the system of centre-region relations.
Assuming a compilation of primary trends as a principal criterion 
taking place within the system of the centre-regions relations, it specifies 
two fundamental stages of development of federalism in Russia: level of 
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the decentralization (1990–1999) and centralization (2000–present). In 
order to attain a more detailed and deeper model for the analysis of federal 
relations, including e.g. the problem of asymmetry, the consequences of 
the Kremlin’s centralizing efforts, and of federalist theories, we will take 
into consideration three periods that are universally accepted by scholars 
(Petrov 2000; Zakharov 2008): 1) period of sovereignty parades (1990–
1993); 2) period of asymmetric federalism (1993–1999); and 3) period of 
unitary federalism (2000 – present). 
The first period is connected with the dissolution of the Soviet 
Union and the “parade of sovereignty” that was the process of rapid and 
uncontrolled pursuit of the Russian federal subjects (mainly republics) to 
gain greater autonomy. This period stemmed from the aftermath of the 
struggle between Boris Yeltsin and Mikhail Gorbachev.
During the second period, referred to as asymmetric federalism, the 
Constitution had set out principles of the centre-regions relations and 
federalism, though it must be pointed out that the principles were laid 
out in constitutionally and not in treaty form. Regions exploited the 
constitutional options and established their own model of the system of 
power. In practice “the worst-case scenario” materialized due to attempts 
at combining the processes of federalization and democratization of the 
political system. Regional elites legislated authoritarian systems in many 
regions, they corrupted federal officials in regions and got out of control. 
The significant structural asymmetry, which features the Russian federal 
subjects (including differences in the socio-economic development) made 
a difference in Russian federalism – regions varied and there were different 
relations with the centre.
The third period began in 1999, specifically when Vladimir Putin 
was elected as President of Russia in March 2000. Its distinctive feature 
is the establishment of the unitary federalism model. In 2000, the 
process of restoring the constitutional-legal unity, which was undergoing 
a “dictatorship of law,” began in Russia. It reduced the role of regions on 
the federal decision-making process (including the change of principles 
during the election of the Federation Council) and regional decision-
making process (elimination of the highest officials of the Russian 
Federation during general elections). The centre exploited its extensive 
influence over the regions within the construction program of “vertically 
integrated structure of executive power” through establishing the 
accredited representative of the President of Russia in the federal districts. 
This included several regions, regional political systems “penetration” by 
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the Kremlin “party of power,” and prohibiting the functioning of regional 
parties as well as of appropriate salaries for the federal agency workers in the 
specified regions. Finally, some parts of regional actions and competence 
were transferred to the federal centre. Then, centre-regions bilateral 
connections, concluded in the 1990s, about the separation of actions and 
competence, were terminated. Then they were replaced by federal laws 
that clarified constitutional provisions of common federal and political 
entities competence (Starodubrovskaya and Glazychev 2011). Due to the 
further divergence between formal-legal establishment of federalism in 
Russia and daily federalist practice (or rather its lack of) connected with 
the Kremlin’s lack of the readiness to get rid of federal rules from the 
Constitution, Russia is called a “federation without federalism”. It should 
be noted that Russian authorities treat federalism as “unitary,” due to 
the fact that they attempt to reconcile the benefits of federalism with the 
practices of a unitary state (Zakharov 2008, 114–116).
4.4.  The evolution of federal legislation regulating 
rules of international activity of the Russian 
Federation’s federal subjects
Due to the international cooperation of the Russian Federation’s 
federal subjects and relations between the federal centre and regions, 
these problems are regulated by complex legislative measures, which are: 
the 1993 Constitution of the Russian Federation, the 1992 Federative 
Agreement, agreements demarcated mandates and actions, federal 
agreements, and agreements solely relating to international relations with 
the Russian Federation and its federal subjects.
The international activity of Russian regions had first been included in 
the Russian legal and political system by the 1992 Federative Agreement. 
At that time, national republics of the Russian Federation were granted 
special status with reference to international activity.
It was a derivative of accepted establishment: republics (states) are able 
to dispose of the entirety of state power (judiciary, executive and legislature) 
on its territory, in the exception of mandates that were given to federal 
public authorities (Article 3, Section 1, Federative Agreement). Republics 
are considered as independent participants in international affairs and 
international economic affairs, however, federal public authorities together 
with republics of the Russian Federation under the Federative Agreement 
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Article 3, Section 1 are able to coordinate the international relations and 
international economic relations of the republics (Rossiyskaya Federatsiya, 
Federativnyy dogovor).
During the movement of spontaneous and uncontrolled 
decentralization, which was connected with the inertia of the dissolution 
of the Soviet Union, the federal centre gave national republics a great deal 
of autonomy, including international activity, believing it would satiate 
the appetites of their leaders and fulfil other demands (as well as curtail 
any pursuit to secession). The last one was treated with great concern as it 
was a significant attribute of independence and freedom from the Kremlin. 
When the federal power became strong enough, Yeltsin took control over 
the centre and the menace of Russia’s disintegration disappeared, then all 
rights given to national republics were taken away. At first, formally then 
practically, this process ended under the Vladimir Putin’s governance.
The 1993 Constitution of the Russian Federation gives foreign policy, 
participation in international relations, conclusion of international 
agreements, international trade, establishing status and the protection 
of borders of state, maritime border, air space, exclusive economic zone 
and the continental shelf to the Russian Federation. The federal centre 
is responsible for defence and national security, war and peace, defence 
industry and weapon trade (Rossiyskaya Federatsiya, Konstitutsiya 
Rossiyskoy Federatsii).
In the area of common activity of the centre and federal subjects are the 
following issues that may partially affect interests of regions: coordination 
of international relations and economic relations between federal subjects 
and foreign states as well as execution of international agreements that the 
Russian Federation has concluded (Rossiyskaya Federatsiya, Konstitutsiya 
Rossiyskoy Federatsii).
Rostislav Turovskiy emphasizes these are features that help the federal 
centre, provide support of interests of regional companies with foreign 
states or to attract foreign investors (Turovskiy 2011, 100).
In the 1990s, the process of legally institutionalizing the international 
activities of federal subjects on the federal level included the adoption of 
three federal laws: On the Russian Federation International Agreements, 
adopted in July 1995; On the State Regulation of Economic Foreign 
Activity, entered into force in October of the same year; and finally, 
Presidential Decree On Coordinative Role of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
of the Russian Federation in the Process of Forming Consistent Foreign 
Policy, published in 1996.
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The first federal agreement that attempted to regulate mutual 
relations between the federal centre and federal subjects of the Russian 
Federation in the area of international activity of the latter was On 
Public Regulation of Rules of Economic Cooperation with Foreign 
States Agreement adopted in October 1995, which was replaced by On 
Elements of Public Regulation of Rules of Economic Cooperation with 
Foreign States Agreement adopted in 2003 and On the Russian Federation 
International Agreements adopted in 1995 (Namchak 2012, 76).
The 2003 On Elements of Public Regulation of Rules of Economic 
Cooperation with Foreign States Agreement assumed that federal subjects 
in the area of international economic cooperation within its competences 
are able to: 1) negotiate and conclude, under the consent of the Russian 
government, international economic cooperation agreements with other 
states’ public subjects, with administrative and territorial units of foreign 
states, and with state authorities of mentioned overseas areas; and 2) hold 
its own representatives during Russian trade meetings with foreign states, 
which are funded by the subject’s budget after consulting the federal 
government (Gosudarstvennaya Duma, Sovet Federatsii, Ob osnovakh 
gosudarstvennogo regulirovaniya vneshnetorgovoy deyatel’nosti).
The agreement established the obligation that regional and federal 
authorities had to negotiate projects with reference to plans and programs 
of economic development and cooperation that may have influence on the 
interests of the Russian Federation. The agreement instructs the federal 
subjects’ authorities to inform the federal government of all its activities 
in the area of mutual international economic cooperation activities.
The law On the Russian Federation International Agreements 
emphasize the problem of mandates of the Russian Federation and its 
regions in the area of conclusion of international agreements, specifically, 
if the content of the agreement comes under the scope of mandates 
of region. In this case authorization must be obtained from the public 
authority of interested region. Recommendations of regional authorities 
are examined at designing “content” of agreement under Article 4, 
Section  2 (Gosudarstvennaya Duma, O mezhdunarodnykh dogovorakh 
Rossiyskoy Federatsii).
The coordinated international cooperation and international economic 
cooperation agreement adopted in 1999 attempted to develop and structure 
the constitutional provision (article 72) of cooperation (coordination) of 
federal subjects and the Russian Federation (Gosudarstvennaya Duma, 
O poryadke koordinatsii mezhdunarodnykh i vneshneekonomicheskikh 
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svyazey). Section 1 of the foregoing agreement establishes the right of 
regions to participate in international cooperation and international 
economic cooperation. The agreement provides a specified procedure in 
reference to the realization of international cooperation and international 
economic cooperation of Russian Federation subjects. It assumes, inter 
alia, that the project must be negotiated between subject, federal subjects 
of other federal states, administrative and territorial units of foreign 
states, international organizations and public authorities of other states, 
and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. After concluding the abovementioned 
agreement it is registered by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian 
Federation and is in the public legal acts register.
The institutional-legal arrangements in regional international activity 
area were positively reviewed in the political scientist community. It was 
indicated that regulation of international activity of regions on the federal 
level contributed to the fact that the legislative activity of subjects was 
“well-considered and well-defined in compliance with federal legislation.” 
The same applied to agreements concluded with foreign partners – they 
became more specific, the rules regulating procedures related to the 
opening of representative offices of subjects overseas more structured 
(Rychlik 2014, 277–278). On the other hand, the legal institutionalization 
of regional international activity on the federal level resulted in substantial 
limits on the autonomy of regions in this area of Russian federalism 
activity. Moreover, many problems concerning regional international 
cooperation have not been regulated. The lack of legal regulation of cross-
border (trans-border) cooperation with Russian regions and local authority 
units is the best example of it. Despite taking longstanding attempts that 
interested regions and chamber of regions, i.e. the Federation Council of 
Russia, regulations concerning cross-border (trans-border) cooperation 
with Russian regions and local authority units has been halted (Rada 
Europy, Europejska konwencja ramowa o współpracy transgranicznej; 
Mironow and Burbulis 2010). 
4.5.  Typology of forms of international activity  
of the Russian regions
By adopting Ivo Duchachek’s classical division on regional 
international activity of national states, also called paradiplomacy, 
Andrey Makarychev believes that in the case of Russia its following 
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forms may be observed: 1) cross-border (trans-border) cooperation which 
takes place on the micro-regional level; 2) trans-regional paradiplomacy 
– the cooperation is implemented with regions that are not neighbours 
but are part of states of adjacent territories; and 3) the macro-regional 
paradiplomacy –  regional international activity which is unlimited by 
geographical borders (Makarychev 1999, 508).
Using the abovementioned typology of activity, which provides the 
way of regional commitment in international cooperation, two types of 
activity can be specified: direct activity and indirect activity. Direct forms 
of Russian regions’ international activity are as follows:
– Creating the legal basis of international activity, an element of 
utmost importance end developed rapidly in the 1990s. At that time, 
Russian regions first approached the opportunity to cooperate with the 
outside world, and simultaneously, were trying to legitimize their outside 
activities in formal-legal ways.
– Cross-border cooperation. In Russia, this kind of cooperation is limited 
as a result of a “vacuum” on the federal level in the area of abovementioned 
cross-border cooperation (Mironow and Burbulis 2010). However, the lack 
of legislation does not eliminate the opportunity of Russian regions and local 
authority units actions in the work of the Euro regions which are considered 
to be a “central institutionalized form of cross-border cooperation” in 
Russia. Euro regions with Russian support are members of the Association 
of European Border Regions (Turovskiy 2011, 101).
– Keeping contacts with foreign states to attract investors and/or 
raising the level of international recognition of the region. These tasks 
would be and are made through regional structures but for financial 
reasons they are made more and more often through federal structures: 
embassies, consulates, and trade missions. However, the exception is 
the international activity made by Tatarstan, which opened 16 foreign 
representative offices in the 1990s (Sharafutdinova 2005, 393) or Saint 
Petersburg, which retained the network of information and business 
centre consisting of 13 institutions, mostly based in the Baltic and Nordic 
countries (Sergunin and Joenniemi 2014, 11–12).
Regional authorities use indirect international activity to influence 
federal institutions that are responsible for the implementation of Russian 
foreign policy. In this sense, the Federation Council of Russia (Chamber 
of Regions) is also involved in the implementation of paradiplomacy, 
especially when in the 1990s its ex-officio members were chiefs of 
executive and legislative powers of the Russian federal subjects.
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Analysing the indirect forms of regional international activity after 
2000, on the basis of federal government activity, which uses regions as 
a means to an end in the process of implementing Russian foreign policy, it 
may attempt to develop the existing typology to active and passive forms of 
indirect activities. In the case of passive activities, regions are the centre’s 
matter of interest due to the opportunity of using its resources in the process 
of goal implementation established in foreign policy. For example the 
territory of the Russian-Kazakh border provides development of cooperation 
between Russia and Kazakhstan without the participation of regional 
authorities while at the same time urging regions to cooperate (Turovskiy 
2011, 100–101). However, due to active activities, regions attempt to use 
federal centre activity in the area of foreign policy. One such example is of 
regions participating in delegations with foreign federal officials, such as 
Eduard Rossel, Governor of the Sverdlovsk Oblast, who was a participant 
during Vladimir Putin’s visit to Bavaria (Kuznetsov 2009).
4.6. Conditions of regional international activity
The origins of international activity of federal subjects of the 
Russian Federation is connected with the simultaneous experiments 
of the development of a free market economy, democratization and 
decentralization of power that started in the Russia in the 1990s. Due 
to these experiments, Russian regions were able to take a change in the 
globalization and regionalization processes. 
Analysing the academic discourse that emphasizes the problem 
of conditions forcing Russian regions to be involved in international 
cooperation, it can be easily noticed that it is divided into two periods that 
are connected with the historical evolution of Russian federalism and the 
entire political system. The first period is connected with the beginnings of 
political transformation in Russia. Within the second period the regional 
activity is perceived in the light of centralization (and de-federalization) 
of the Russian political system, which began after 1999. An equivalent 
approach is also used in attempts to define the general model of centre-
regions relations due to regional international activity.
The problem of what conditions stimulate Russian regions to approach 
international cooperation has become the subject of political debate. The 
authors believe that the abovementioned conditions may be divided into 
two main categories, on the basis of the following instructions, which 
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have an influence on the decision making involvement of international 
cooperation by region (-s) that: 1) are connected with presence and influence 
of structural and processual factors; and 2) are related to the impact of 
internal factors (political and socio-economic) as well as external factors 
(any kind of processes occurring outside the Russian political system).
“Allocating” the above typology in the historical context of political 
transformation in Russia, it is seen that in the first political transformation 
period in Russia internal factors (decentralization, democratization, 
nationalism) came to the fore. However, external factors, like globalization 
and regionalization also played an important role – they formed a context, 
they gave the opportunity to free energy which was generated by internal 
factors. In the second period, connected with centralization and overcoming 
the legacy of the 1990s decentralization, external factors permanently 
were set aside. The Kremlin took control of regions and limited their 
opportunity to react on external impetuses, which is understandable if 
we consider the Kremlin elites’ approach to terms such as globalization, 
international sovereignty, and sphere of interest (Leichtova 2014, 21–26; 
Lo 2002, 102–118; Goble 1999).
External conditions of international cooperation with regions, such as 
globalization and regionalization were considered as a real chance to boost 
socio-economic development, which was possible through participation 
in global trade and/or in the regional cooperation processes. Experiences 
of European regions have become an attractive point of reference and have 
provided a basis for inspiration and argumentation for Russian regional 
leaders for the development of cooperation with member states in Western 
and Central Europe. This kind of activity was free from secession threats 
and nationalistic appeals.
Analysing the idea of internal factors it can be seen that some subjects 
of the Russian Federation used international activity as a chance to boost 
decision-making autonomy, which provided additional (external) resources 
that allowed further independency from the centre. The development of 
international cooperation constituted a part in regional emancipation process, 
starting with the “parade of sovereignty” period, and was evidence of centre-
periphery division. This kind of activity was accompanied with mottos and 
nationalistic and separatist declarations. The international activity of such 
regions as Tatarstan or Bashkortostan was the logical assumption of their 
struggle to obtain special status in the Russian Federation.
In keeping with speculations over the external causes of providing 
international activity, it is worth noting that some Russian regions, whose 
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geographical location allowed to place them in the periphery, provided 
international activity despite structural circumstances. It was the will to 
overcome the periphery complex and the feel of marginality that brought 
this about. However, in their pursuit periphery, ironically, was their only 
asset. Peripheral became an asset because regions started playing a unique 
role as a broker, mediator, and a “platform” between Russia and other 
players of Northern Europe (Joenniemi and Sergunin 2014, 21).
Many regions, especially from North-western Russia and the Far East, 
were forced to cooperate with foreign countries because they were not able 
to provide the financial needs of their citizens. During the deep economic 
crisis in the 1990s, the federal centre was not able to provide their needs 
to a satisfactory level.
Occasionally, internal and structural motives, e.g. economic, were 
accompanied with political ideas – the pursuit for independence in ethno-
political and ethno-religious issues. Tatarstan was a splendid example of 
joint conditions of international activity of Russian regions at that time. 
Its rational (economic) activities were followed with ambitious to become 
independent from the centre and to keep ties with the Islamic community 
(Sharafutdinova 2005, 394).
While analysing the processual conditions of regions’ international 
activity ideas, it is important to stress that in Russia, at least until the early 
21st century, the international activity of regions developed dynamically and 
unorganized. Sometimes regions knowingly against the Kremlin interests 
violated federal regulations, delegitimized the Kremlin’s activities in the 
international area or even took over the centre’s international commitments. 
The roots of this problem are not located in structural conditions but in 
political conditions. The activity of some regions on the international area 
resulted in providing their leaders that were at the forefront of regional 
“political and electoral machines” functioning under patronal-clientelistic 
rules with political capital (Chirikova and Lapina 2001, 43).
Since 2000, the group of important internal conditions of 
regional international activity “increased” through the federal 
centre’s inspiration to act. Before 2000, the Kremlin was looking at 
these regional developments with kindness, which corresponds to its 
interests. However, only since 2000, when it had additional material 
and immaterial resources (social legitimization for centralization 
activities), was it be able to effectively stimulate the development of 
international cooperation of regions with chosen states and/or regions 
in the most desired shape and areas.
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Rostislav Turovskiy suggests a different kind of approach to the 
problem of international activity of Russian regions. Not only does he 
focus on the problem of motives of regional activity, but he also points 
out the subjective expectations of the involved players in international 
cooperation as a decisive factor causing a certain type of cooperation. 
Turovskiy specifies three regional contribution models in international 
activity including subject/subjects stimulating such an activity. These 
models are defined as: administrative, network, and corporate. It goes 
without saying that the administrative model was and still is the dominant 
model in Russian realities. The main characteristic of such a model is that 
regional international activity is based on activities of institutionalized 
groups of interests disguised as bureaucratic elites functioning within its 
formal representatives. The goals of administrative paradiplomacy can 
make interests of the entire community (region) or can be a mechanism 
of providing needs for bureaucracy, which are sometimes totally unrealistic 
(Turovskiy 2011, 100). The ongoing process of centralization of the centre-
region relations system leads to the objective usage of regions by the federal 
authorities in order to provide their own needs at the expense of local elites’ 
needs, including regional bureaucracy (Kuznetsov 2015, 116).
4.7. The level of frequency of international activity 
of Russian regions
In the literature on the subject we can find elaborated research 
concerning the difference of the level of frequency of international activity 
of Russian regions and its origins produced in Russia and overseas. Research 
data is available and reveals defined patterns of activity regions including 
their structural characteristics. Russian macro-regions are also compared– 
this task is simplified due to the institutions of federal oblasts, which 
were set up since 2000. They are political and administrative links in the 
vertically integrated structure of executive power by which the Kremlin 
controls the activity of regional powers and coordinates the actions of 
federal agencies in the region for the implementation of abovementioned 
task (Reisinger and Yoo 2012).
In the case of Russia, the level of international activity of regions is 
associated with their structural features, such as the size of territory as 
well as socio-economic and cultural abilities. The conditions of a region’s 
involvement in cooperation with the outside world plays an essential 
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importance here. The wealth of a region determines the financial capability 
of maintaining assignments and foreign representatives that are supposed 
to provide needs for the region. There is a strong dependence between 
economic and political activity of regions in the international area. The 
increasing economic activity is always accompanied by a significant level 
of political activity, though on the other hand, some regions, despite 
political involvement in cooperation with the outside world, do not have 
much to offer to their trade partners in the economic area. The economic 
activity does not cope with the political will of cooperation.
The abovementioned statements are not innovative from the point 
of paradiplomacy comparative studies, however, in the case of Russia, 
the problem of influence of broadly defined geography is surprisingly 
developing. At the same time, it can be analysed in different ways.
First of all, ethnic social structure and the legal-constitutional status 
related to it (a derivative of ethno-territorial model of Russian federalism) 
play a significant role in the activity in regional international cooperation. 
The specificity of a subject that is a region, selected on ethnic criteria, is 
not sufficient enough to guarantee active participation in international 
cooperation. The examples of Yakutia (Sakha), Tatarstan, and Bashkorstan, 
attest that economic conditions such as the occurrence of natural 
resources, an industrial park, investment areas, economic diversification 
and administrative support are additional conditions which are necessary. 
It has to be said that federal cities take the leading role in concluding 
international agreements, with a median of 65 agreements. Oblasts and 
countries (subjects selected on geographical and historical criteria, mostly 
ethnically Russian) hold a total of 10.1 agreements while republics and 
autonomous okrugs – 3 agreements (Reisinger and Yoo 2012, 15).
Secondly, the importance of geographical factors can be considered 
as a cross-border region. In the Russian reality, the border status does 
not guarantee success in international activity. The proximity of the 
state border is not always a blessing but a curse for cross-border regions. 
The ethnic trans-border organized crime is a major threat in Russia (it is 
determined by history, geography and ethnic structure of modern Russia). 
In the case of the Russian Far East we are dealing with organized criminal 
groups of Chinese origins involved in trafficking, bootlegging, and illegal 
trade such as wood smuggling (Nasyrov 2005, 152).
The problem of borders that influence international activity of 
Russian regions and its frequency are perceived through the functional 
theory of border clarification. According to this theory, Russian borders 
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accomplish many roles but one cannot say for sure that they mostly act 
as a contact – they are not considered as a place to establish cooperation. 
The dominant roles played by borders here are filter and barrier functions. 
Turovskiy also emphasizes that Russian borders will play different roles 
depending on geographical location – in the case of Belarus, the border 
plays an integration role but the Kazakhstan border and, until recently, 
the border with Ukraine have played a uniting role (Turovskiy 2011, 104).
Moreover, the “quality” of proximity plays a significant role in the 
geographic-border context. The nature and frequency of international 
activity of a Russian region depends on the placement of the region, if 
the region is located in European (Northwest), North Caucasian Russian, 
or in the Far East. In the case of Northwest Russia, these regions were 
able to embrace the benefits offered by Euro-regions, especially the 
EU institutionalized forms of support for trans-border (cross-border) 
cooperation.. Other regions unfortunately were not placed is such 
a  favourable position. As a consequence, not all Russian border regions 
recognized themselves as the Russian “window to the world.” Some of 
them recognized themselves as “forward stations,” therefore, they focused 
on preventing negative influences approaching from the outside world, 
mainly from direct proximity. This shows obvious (geographical) truth, 
because the South Russian regions recognized themselves as “forward 
stations.”
In the case of Russia, the size of the territory (also “extension of 
territory”) might be a barrier due to international cooperation. It generates 
considerable costs connected with establishing and sustaining international 
cooperation, resulting in some groups of regions sustaining cooperation 
mainly with regions and states that are geographically near. Combining 
these statements with the fact that Western Europe usually provides many 
opportunities and different forms of cooperation, it is understandable 
that: the Northwest Russian regions cooperate with European states, 
the southern regions cooperate with Kazakhstan and Siberia, and the 
Russian Far East cooperate with the Southeast Asian countries. When 
it comes to international cooperation, the following regions have a clear 
lead: Northwest – 19.8 agreements, South – 13.7 agreements and Central 
– 13 agreements. The North Caucasian regions with 3 agreements and 
the Far Eastern regions with 3.2 agreements bring up the rear (Reisinger 
and Yoo 2012, 15). Some regions like Moscow or Saint Petersburg “boost 
the average” of its districts. They deform the results due to particular 
activities and possibilities which are offered by having been a capital city 
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of Russia.. What is noticeable is that the Russian Far East has a very low 
internationalization level, which is surprising. In spite of an attractive 
location regarding economic terms in the Northwest Asian region that 
is rapidly developing, the Far East does not seem to be internationalizing 
quickly. It is clear that the Far Eastern region (the Far East Federal District) 
differs from other macro-regions in the accumulation of foreign investment 
(5% share of other federal districts) or in export (4% share), which is 
probably a derivative of the small number of population and modest 
industrial and agriculture capacity (Ross 2002, 89). The degradation of 
Siberia and the Far East regions proclaims a geopolitical threat to Russia 
(Ryzkhov and Turovskiy, 2013).
In the literature on the subject it is often emphasized that democracy 
(democratization) has a positive influence on the development of regional 
international cooperation. In the case of Russia, this structural factor, that 
is, the nature of political system, does not affect the frequency level of 
international contacts. The experience of international activity of Russian 
regions in the 1990s showed that the major activity in this area was in 
both “democratic” regions like Nizhny Novgorod Oblast, under Boris 
Nemtsov’s rule, and “authoritarian” regions like Moscow under Yury 
Luzhkov. An interesting note regarding Luzhkov, as he keeps highly liberal 
views in the socio-economic area, while on the other hand he is keen on 
the traditional model of the power density with Soviet overtones and the 
creation of a great patronal-clientelistic system (Alexandrov 2001, 13).
Few authors emphasize that regional internationalization and 
its successes in the paradiplomacy area are mainly the consequences 
of the centre’s will and involvement of activity of the region. Before 
2000 both Nizhny Novgorod Oblast and Samara Oblast played particular 
importance. Both oblasts were considered as pioneers in the development 
of free market processes and attracting foreign investment. The Kremlin 
appreciated their value and importance from the possibility to “extend” 
their experiences to other regions, this resulted in the Kremlin’s support 
in international activity (Chirikova and Lapina 2001, 44). However, the 
case of Saint Petersburg after 2000 shows that q region can have expanded 
economic and cultural connections with the world, especially with Europe, 
because the Kremlin prefers such cooperation. It is advantageous to the 
Russian Federation as a whole and thus the Kremlin undertakes steps 
to stimulate this cooperation (Reisinger and Yoo 2012, 23; Joenniemi 
and Sergunin, 2014, 24). The same will happen to the Russian Far East 
regions that are encouraged to cooperate with Chinese regions, which 
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significantly develop their internationalization level (Assotsiatsiya 
ekonomicheskogo vzaimodeystviya sub’’yektov Rossiyskoy Federatsii 
“Dal’niy Vostok i abaykal’ye” 2014). The latter obviously require federal 
centre support, because, as was mentioned, the regions’ modernization 
seems to be unable to be realized without the involvement of (diversified) 
investment of Northeast Asia members (Ryzkhov and Turovskiy, 2013).
In Russian literature the problem of different regional 
internationalization due to cooperation with the outside world in both 
frequency and nature of these relations is seen in the light of the socio-
economic and ethno-cultural diversification of Russian regions. It can 
be assumed that the level of international activity of regions (their 
internationalization) shows current differentiation level (asymmetry) of 
regions, if we consider their economic potential and level of social progress 
(Zubarevich 2014).
Yuriy Dem’yanenko, indicates three groups of factors that determine 
the level of regional internationalization: 
1) geographic (geo-economic location of the region – central, semi-
periphery, periphery, internal and cross-border regions); 
2) socio-economic (general development level, potential of natural 
resources, dominant structure of industry, the presence of export-oriented 
industries, financial stability, investment activity, regional diversification 
of the population’s income standard, labour market, level of unemployment 
and the quality of environment);
3) political-legal (the nature of political system, the profile of regional 
political and economic elites, their lasting and meaning from the regional 
situation perspective, the population’s political preferences views, the 
presence of political threats and level of regional legislative) (Dem’yanenko 
2013, 199). 
As a matter of fact, there are four regional groups created – just as 
there are four regions in Russia (Zubarevich 2012): 
1. Regions in the first group (super league) have developed an export-
oriented economy and attract a high level of investment, their elites are 
active and institutionalized, have developed international connections, 
the regional economy is strong, diversified and export-oriented. This 
group consists of: Moscow, Saint Petersburg, Tatarstan, Bashkiria, Sakha 
(Yakutia), Novgorod Oblast, Samara Oblast, Pskov Oblast, Rostov Oblast, 
Nizhny Novgorod Oblast, Sverdlovsk Oblast, and Khabarovsk Krai. They 
are sometimes called “globalization islands” in Russia. It should not be 
misunderstood with the poorer “forward stations” category. 
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2. In the second group (league one) are regions that have an export-
oriented economy or are connected with external economic institutions, have 
developed legislation in matters of international cooperation, and their elites 
use regional cross-border status to establish international cooperation. This 
group consists of: Kaliningrad Oblast, Leningrad Oblast, Volgograd Oblast, 
Arkhangelsk Oblast, Sakhalin Oblast, Primorskiy Krai, Karelia, and Komi. 
3. In the third group (second league), regions have huge natural 
resources, have a high level of socio-economic progress and a sizeable 
index of commodity exchange with the outside. This group consists of: 
Khanty-Mansi Autonomous Okrug, Yamalo-Nenets Autonomous Okrug, 
Nenets Autonomous Okrug, Tyumen Oblast, and Perm Krai. 
4. In the fourth group (third league) regions suffer a low level of 
legislative development that controls international cooperation, provide 
limited level of international connections, have a low level of socio-
economic progress, and provide limited export opportunities. The Republic 
of North Caucasus, Chita Oblast, Ulyanovsk Oblast, and Penza are in this 
category. (Dem’yanenko 2013, 199).
4.8. Russian federal elites’ strategic culture and its 
influence on regions international activity
In order to better understand the evolution of centre-regions relations 
due to the problem of the Russian regions involvement in international 
cooperation, we should familiarize ourselves with the main thoughts and 
views of Russian federal representative elites according to such terms 
as: sovereignty, globalization/glocalization, and paradiplomacy. Those 
notions are firmly linked with Russian strategic culture and affect not 
only foreign and defence policy concepts, but also the development of 
federal relations–including regions’ international activity.
The Russian federal centre embodied by its political elites in the 1990s 
(mainly connected with the military department)still had a frigid attitude 
to any activity which might have resulted in the violation of Russian 
sovereignty. As a result, the Russian federal elite’s “power cohort,” which 
was responsible for shaping Russian foreign policy and security policy, 
perceived globalization with high suspicion. Later, mostly influenced by 
the involvement of the West in building democracy in states that were 
denied of it and by the humanitarian intervention, it was rejected as an 
unacceptable concept of “limited sovereignty” (Makarychev 2001).
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Globalization itself was treated as a tool for the US and their allies to 
put Russia under geopolitical domination. The power centralization, which 
means taking back regions and their power abilities, even in international 
activity, seemed to be a beneficial action that strengthened the national 
security of Russia. It averted the danger of putting Russia under control of 
one geopolitical power centre (Makarychev 2001).
Finally, the glocalization was also censured. The NGOs’ international 
activity on the regional level in Russia seemed to be treated as a threat 
to national security and considered it as a responsible factor for the 
destabilization of world peace. The NGOs involvement in political 
events within Ukraine and previously within Georgia was taken seriously 
by Russian leaders and many preventive actions were taken on to stop 
spreading “the orange virus” (Ambrosio 2009, 45–53).
The protection of the Russian political system against the exogenous 
promotion of democracy resulted in adopting legislation against 
“foreign agents’ influence,” which limited the cooperation possibilities 
at the regional level and between Russian NGOs and foreign donators 
(Nikol’skaya and Romanycheva 2015).
In the literature on the subject we can quote many statements of 
federal officials claiming that in the Russian elites’ “strategic thinking 
culture” exists. Its specified feature has been and still is reluctance 
towards excessive regional autonomy, including international activity. 
The 1999 interview with Eduard Kuzmin, a Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
senior official, deserves special attention (Goble). Kuzmin claimed that 
Russian foreign competitors are not interested in the integrity of Russia. 
Some powers, he assumes, do not spare their efforts and resources to 
achieve many privileges from Russian regions and avoid the federal centre 
by creating “international attraction zones.” He accused foreign (Western) 
countries of the tendency to make dependencies among Russian regions 
in natural, financial and technological matters; increasing their foreign 
debt, decreasing export goods prices and finally disrupting Russian society 
as a whole (Goble 1999). Some analysts reported that in the time period 
preceding Vladimir Putin’s governance, the Russian federal centre at 
least had an ambivalent attitude to regional international activity. On 
the one hand, the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs appreciated regions 
attracting foreign investment and sustaining connections with ethnic 
Russians in the post-Soviet countries, on the other hand, it was disturbed 
by misrepresenting the Russian foreign policy message by regional 
paradiplomacy or supporting the centrifugal trends and separatism in 
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Russia (Goble 1999). The lack of strict coordination between the centre 
and regions made for actions and statements by the latter that jeopardized 
Moscow’s interests and actions due to relations with Taiwan as well as 
the UN and its agencies. The paradiplomacy development should have 
stimulated increasing separatist trends – many republics definitely 
have  gone beyond the agreed constitutional framework and demanded 
rights to provide their own foreign policy on issues such as: war and peace, 
nuclear zones and other zones reserved for Moscow. This attitude had to 
have a  dangerously contagious influence on other regions. “This keeps 
up, every village may have their own Ministry of Foreign Affairs,” claimed 
Kuzmin (Goble 1999).
Russian authors analysing the problem of regional international 
activity before and after 2000 formulated statements that ambivalent 
attitudes on the side of the centre, due to Russian federalism operating 
on this matter, were accompanied by attempts of regional marginalization 
from the Russian foreign policy perspective. Andrey Makarychev 
indicated that before 2001 in Russian documents as warfare doctrine or 
foreign policy concept, which are important from the national security 
perspective, there is no mention of regional role in the international area. 
The further documents also do not provide information about the regional 
involvement in Russian foreign policy (Makarychev 2001). It is worth taking 
note on this degradation and marginalization form of regional activity 
by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The information about international 
cooperation and regional economic cooperation between Russia and the 
outside world can be found on Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ (MOFA’s) 
official site in “economic diplomacy” subpage (Ministerstvo inostrannykh 
del Rossiyskoy Federatsii, “Mezhdunarodnyye i vneshneekonomicheskiye 
svyazi sub’’yektov Rossiyskoy Federatsii).
Rostislav Turovskiy emphasizes that the centre’s reluctance to simplify 
international activity to regions and local authorities units was easily 
seen when dealing with problems connected with adopting trans-border 
agreements. It should have resulted in a statism idea of creating Russian 
foreign policy, which assumed that international regional cooperation is 
acceptable but it has to include mandatory checks (Turovskiy 2011, 103). 
The federal centre did not want to simplify the development of regional 
international cooperation by establishing common and legible rules due 
to cross-border (trans-border) cooperation. This kind of cooperation had 
to use only such rules which were appreciated by the Kremlin and would 
guarantee implementation of Russian goals.
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This statism approach to paradiplomacy is in practical usage in Russia 
at the present time and comprises a derivative of changes, which arose 
among political leaders since 1999. However, in the 1990s, which should 
be emphasized, there was a trend to subordinate regional activity to the 
state and it was strictly sketched in Russian federal leaders’ minds. In 
a wider perspective of political discourse it should be emphasized that 
“liberal” and a pro-Western approach in the Russian foreign policy scarcely 
hid strong realism trends (M. Leichtova 2014, 21).
When Vladimir Putin, former Director of the Federal Security Service 
(FSB), was elected as president, political, business and administrative 
elites’ ranks were filled with so called “siloviki,” i.e. members of Russia’s 
state agencies that are authorized to use violence to respond to threats to 
national security (Soldatov and Rochlitz 2007, 1). As a result, the statism 
model of foreign policy started developing rapidly.
The increasing FSB significance supported consolidation of the Federal 
Security Border, which came back into “the lap” of the FSB. Its “interests” 
were put above needs of the local communities, especially, these near 
the border. An example of this policy is the extension of the border area 
regime. The cross-border zone is not considered as a cooperation zone 
(Turovskiy 2011, 103).
The relation model was created in the legal institutionalization 
process of regional international activity, which started in the mid-
1990s, and it was fully appreciated by the centre. It worked with fears 
and prejudices regarding the excessive and deprived control of regional 
autonomy and coordination role of the centre due to their international 
cooperation. Since 2000, many normative acts were adopted which 
strengthen the rule to coordinate the regional international activity by 
the centre (Namchak 2012, 76–78). Examples of such acts include the 
2002 On the Russian Federation Representative of the Russian Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs Ordinance act and its later modifications On the Territorial 
Body Ordinance – the RFMOFA representative on 22 November 2011 
(Ministerstvo inostrannykh del Rossiyskoy Federatsii, Polozheniye 
o  territorial’nom organe – Predstavitel’stve Ministerstva inostrannykh 
del, 2011). The abovementioned ordinance provided on MOFA’s regional 
representative to secure respect for the Russian Federation foreign policy 
cohesion and to control the implementation of basic coordination of the 
international activity of FR federal subjects (Ministerstvo inostrannykh 
del Rossiyskoy Federatsii, Polozheniye o territorial’nom organe 
– Predstavitel’stve Ministerstva inostrannykh del, 2011).
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4.9. Two models of centre-regions relations due to 
international activity of Russian regions
While trying to answer what model of centre-regions relations is 
common in Russia, it has to be emphasized that it has changed and 
is divided into two historical periods. During the first period, i.e. before 
2000, there were many models in the Kremlin-regional authorities 
relations. This situation emerged from formal determinants (e.g. from 
centre-regions bilateral agreements) and current (hijacking the centre’s 
competences by regions). the asymmetry between regional relations and 
between the centre and regions, did not circumvent the international 
activity area. However, the model of decentralization and parallel practice 
of international activity played the dominant role. In 1995 and 1996 federal 
agreements were adopted and a Presidential Decree, which established 
mutual relations in regional international activity (though this did not 
change the situation at the time). However, the model of centralized 
centre-regions cooperation, which was coordinated by the federal centre, 
should have been in force.
In some cases it showed harmonious cooperation (centre supported 
regional actions – Nizhny Novgorod) (Chirikova and Lapina 2001, 44) 
in other, more famous, cases conflict-related situations were dealt with, 
i.e. regions involved in international cooperation which took a vote during 
international forums dealing with international policy, in breach of the 
official line and interests of the federal government. The list of diplomatic 
“scandals” – the violation of Russian interests, which were considered as 
a non-conformity of the regional authorities with the Kremlin’s official 
stance, was long in the 1990s. On this list were those regions that held 
a special status and could afford the insubordination, such as Tatarstan, or 
were aware of their absolute impunity (Makarychev 1999, 504–506). The 
international activity, which often is conducted against the Kremlin, violates 
federal authority, delegitimizes its actions and international commitments, 
was used as a tool by regional representative leaders to create political capital 
(Makarychev 1999, 504–506; Chirikova and Lapina, 2001, 43).
In some cases centre-regions conflicts ended “in favour” of the centre. 
One such case is of Kaliningrad Oblast and its trade agreement with 
Lithuania, which was revoked in 1995 considering its non-conformity with 
federal legislation. In many cases region-centre conflicts started because the 
agreements amended in the mid-1990s were not negotiated with MOFA, 
which federal authorities obviously did not appreciate. This was the case 
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of agreement between Kabardino-Balkar and Abkhazia, formally under 
Georgian rule. In many other cases the problem of non-conformity with 
federal legislative emerged from not completing the technical requirements 
connected with its preparation and a lack of MOFA’s legal expert’s opinions 
(Joenniemi and Sergunin, 2014, 23). However, in the Tatarstan case, 
the unappreciated agreements that went against the Kremlin, e.g. with 
Abkhazia, were not terminated (Sharafutdinova, 2005, 394).
In the second period, that is, after 2000, within the creation of 
unitary federalism and electoral authoritarianism, began the actual 
institutionalization of the centralized-coordinative model of centre and 
regions’ actions in the international activity area of the latter. At the present 
time, in centre-regions relations, a centralized decision-making model in 
regional policy was observed, which establishes strict coordination in the 
international area with regions and forced cooperation.
The federal centre, influenced by the negative effects of uncontrolled 
decentralization that took place in the 1990s, on Putin’s initiative started 
serious actions to deny regions of their rights which were granted too 
hastily and/or acquired in an unilateral order. The efforts for ongoing 
legal institutionalization of paradiplomacy, maintained in centralized 
coordination form, were taken from the centralization program. The concept 
of federal centre, in discussed aspect of federal relations, assumed organizing 
a “chaotic environment” in foreign policy, which was formed in Russia due 
to many regional international activities, e.g. due to proper usage of regional 
activity in such a way that they could support Russian foreign policy, which 
represented the interests of the whole country (Ministerstvo inostrannykh 
del Rossiyskoy Federatsii, Kontseptsiya raboty MID Rossii po koordinatsii 
mezhdunarodnykh i vneshneekonomicheskikhsvyazey sub’’yektov, 2001).
Despite many doubts and objections to one-sided relations between the 
Kremlin and regional elites after 2000, what is important is that it should 
be accepted that presidents, elected in general elections, and governors of 
the federal subjects of the Russian Federation, who have been (relatively) 
self-reliant, have become hostages of the Kremlin’s will (but taking into 
consideration formal division of the centre-regions actions they have 
become “federal government agents”). If Yury Luzhkov or every other region 
department chief had taken a policy stance in international affairs, the 
Kremlin would definitely have known about this and appreciated it. Since 
2000, all sorts of “political lawlessness,” such as Luzhkov’s statements 
concerning Ukraine and Georgia that contested their territorial integrity, 
must have ended or had the Kremlin’s “silent approval” (Kurilla 2006).
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4.10. Institutionalization and diversification 
of the centralized-coordinative model in 
centre-regions relations due to regional 
international cooperation
Assuming that in Russia, since 2000, the institutionalization process 
of centralized-coordinative model has been developing in cooperation 
between the centre and regions in paradiplomacy, it is worth noticing that 
it is internally diverse, so it is not consolidated. This diversification is 
exposed when we ask the following questions: 
1. Did centre efficiently and entirely subdue regions? 
2. If the reply to the first question is positive, does the centre control 
model function as one universal model of the relations?
There is surely much truth in the statement that the centre 
subdued regions and their “foreign policy.” The reorganization process 
of federal relations (and their centralization), which includes packing 
regions in a “vertically power structure,” resulted in a severe decrease 
in the significance of the regional international activity. In practice, 
international activity did not decrease, but its nature has been changed. 
Up till now, it corresponds with the unitary federalism model and 
electoral authoritarianism.
Regional international activity is made with strict cooperation with 
the centre. The Kremlin supervises international activity of regional 
authorities and promotes their international cooperation. The best 
example of the mechanisms that dominate Russian paradiplomacy 
in the Far East is The Program of the Far East and East Siberia of the 
Russian Federation and the Northeast region of the People’s Republic 
of China Cooperation in 2009–2018 (Правительствo Российской 
Федерации, Programma sotrudnichestva mezhdu regionami, 2009). This 
program was supposed to give a vigorous boost to regional international 
cooperation of the Russian Far East (which significantly varies from 
other Russian regions) and, at the same time, support the government 
program of the Far East’s modernization. Despite the strategic situation 
that was attributed by the Kremlin in the geo-economic integrity process 
between Russia and Northeast Asian member countries, this region has 
immerged in stagnation, suffered from depopulation, while its citizens 
have suffered from disruptions in energy supply and heating (Karaganov 
et al. 2015, 6–7).
Małgorzata Pietrasiak, Michał Słowikowski164
After 2000, federal authorities have been using the Russian regions as 
a tool for reaching certain goals, that is, as far as international relations 
are concerned. The range of formal mandates of regional authorities is 
restricted, nevertheless, governors and/or regional authorities 
representatives are included in the Russian foreign official delegations. 
Regional territories (mostly cross-border territory) serve as a meeting 
place and interstate consultations take place in a state-to-state form, 
sometimes even without its regional authorities’ participation. The 
Kremlin pursues international cooperation using regional territories but 
without their direct participation, which is a common practice whatever 
the type of cooperation, e.g. cooperation with Kazakhstan or Japan 
(Turovskiy 2011, 100–101).
Regional activity is, in practice, coordinated and/or stimulated by 
new federal authority agencies, which developed during the popularity 
of the centralization of federal relations, through the representative 
plenipotentiary of the president of Russia. The Bureau of the Representative 
Plenipotentiary of the President of the Russian Federation in the Ural 
Federal District is responsible for organizing the international promotion 
of the Ural and Eastern Siberian regions. Kuznetsov emphasizes that some 
regions intentionally highlight the important role of the federal centre 
as an initiator of international endeavours with regions as participants. 
He mentions the cooperation between Sverdlovsk Oblast and Bavaria and 
its logical continuation in the official visit of Eduard Rossel to Germany, 
which was directed by Putin (Kuznetsov, 2009). Since 2007, the Russian 
MOFA promotes regions by giving information about their economic 
and scientific potential, investment policy rules, economic connections 
with outside world, and long-term plans (Ministerstvo inostrannykh 
del Rossiyskoy Federatsii, Ob uchastii Ministra inostrannykh del Rossii 
S. V. Lavrova v prezentatsii Novosibirskoy oblasti, 2016).
However, in the Saint Petersburg case, after 2000 we can notice that 
the region may hold a well-developed economic and cultural network with 
the outside world, including Europe. However, this is only possible if the 
Kremlin appreciates this kind of cooperation for Russia as a whole country 
and provides actions to further stimulate such interaction. Sergunin 
and Joenniemi emphasize that Kremlin will agree to compromise with 
regions and allow them to conclude agreements with states and ministries 
including Austria, Belarus, Lithuania, Tajikistan and Turkmenistan in 
2010–2012 (Joenniemi and Sergunin 2014, 24). The abovementioned 
Saint Petersburg case proves that in conditions of definitely greater control 
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above regional authorities, regions pay a great deal of attention to the 
Kremlin’s expectations and interests in foreign policy. “Vulnerability” 
on the Kremlin’s expectations due to geographical line sand cooperation 
rules between regions and the outside world (mainly with Europe) is 
emphasized in Saint Petersburg’s files, which are mostly about long-term 
plans for socio-economic development. In other words, Saint Petersburg 
can “afford more” in international activity, because its actions correspond 
to the Kremlin’s expectations in foreign policy or they are coordinated 
regional and central policies (Reisinger and Yoo 2012, 22–24.).
Not all regions are equally exposed to the centralized-coordinative 
model, i.e. they are not used as a tool nor are “encouraged” to 
international cooperation. Since 2000, regions-centre relations in 
international  cooperation have depended on many factors. They are 
connected with the region’s significance in the Russian political system, 
political and economic (mainly resources) context and are also linked with 
geopolitical determinants.
It is noticeable that still there are federal subjects that can afford more 
due to relations with the centre, and their leaders are able to protest the 
decision of federal authorities and their regional agencies (Chechnya, 
Tatarstan). Some regions, e.g. Tatarstan, use their political and economic 
uniqueness and enjoy a broad autonomy in both internal and external 
relations in the federal structure system. In the Tatarstan case, there is 
consistent objection towards official change in the republic, i.e. the disuse 
of presidential title, which is a blatant violation of federal legislative norm. 
Moreover, Tatarstan maintains close economic relations with Turkey, which 
has deteriorated since the shooting down of an Russian attack aircraft that 
took part in operations in Syria. Tartarstan’s actions are a direct contrast 
to Bashkortostan who stopped maintaining a representative in Turkey. 
Pro-Russian journalists, such as Rais Suleymanov, who accuse republican 
authorities of providing Islamists support, extending cooperation with 
Turkey and taking actions to become independent from Russia, are 
persecuted by republican authorities (Whitmore 2016; Pertsev 2016).
The other regions, e.g. North-western Russia, are deprived of the 
abovementioned assets but they do not surrender their ambitions without 
a fight nor give up their foreign connections. This is more due to the 
fact that international cooperation takes an essential role in their socio-
economic systems, which can operate normally thanks to it. The same 
case is seen in the Far East where Chinese regions are main source of 
basic commodities. Chinese goods make share of 60–70% of all goods 
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available at the local markets. This is quite understandable if we consider 
that the transport tariff in general cost of goods’ transport is 55% to 70% 
in the Far East Federal District compared to the average Russian at 25% 
(Zykov 2007, 7–10).
Many analysts dealing with the problem of regional international 
cooperation in Russia after 2000 believe that regions (especially cross-
border ones) in the need to acquire resources, which are dwindling and 
are necessary to sustain the source of socio-economic development, 
are looking forward to international cooperation more enthusiastically 
(Abdrazkova and Kurilla 2011, 455). Russian regional political elites 
retain some independence, in spite of the federal centre’s determined 
actions to put them into a vertical power structure and making, from time 
to time, anti-corruption “purges” in the gubernatorial body. Abdrazkova 
and Kurilla claim that the centre’s influence on regions considering 
international activity is minimal – however, they are formally under the 
federal centre’s strict control. Regions are obliged to inform the federal 
centre about their post factum international activity – making quarterly 
reports to MOFA (Abdrazkova and Kurilla 2011, 456).
The control over the regions does not remain absolute, as the K1remlin 
is not able to control the political processes that are developing in regions. 
This results in the lack of competent staff who can simultaneously and 
effectively implement gubernatorial duties and guarantee a high level of 
public support to the Kremlin during federal and regional elections. The 
matter of federal officials’ loyalty is also considered as it was in 1990s, and 
some authors emphasize that representatives of federal agencies should 
nominally control and coordinate regional international cooperation. In 
practice, regional federal agencies are used by regional authorities to put 
pressure on the centre and the abovementioned officials’ dependency 
plays an important role in the accommodation and provisioning aspects 
(Joenniemi and Sergunin 2014, 27). Moreover, only “natives” who have 
close links with local elites can find occupation in regional agencies of 
federal authorities. So corruption, zemlyachestvo, and natural bond with 
representatives of the local political community and its notables play an 
important role here.
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4.11. Implications of federal centre policy due to 
international activity from regions and their 
interest perspective
It should be emphasized that geopolitical and geo-economic issues 
generate tensions between the Kremlin and regions. The federal centre 
sometimes shows direct disapproval when Russian regions cooperate with 
selected outside partners. The Kremlin may have to encourage regions 
to cooperate with China and may kill the development of cooperation 
with the EU countries, or even the West on a wider scale. The tension 
between the centre and regions’ goals may be perceived as the result of the 
needs and expectations of regions and the centre or as evidence that both 
subject groups are functioning in different realities: regional and global. 
The Kremlin, playing global geopolitical game, criticizes the enlargement 
of NATO to the East or isolates the Russian market from Western goods. 
For example, the enlargement of NATO has caused protests mostly in 
Moscow rather than in regions that have borders with future NATO 
member states. The fully negative statement in the mentioned expansion 
is symptomatic of the federal political elites’ “strategic culture”, which 
was analysed earlier. Additionally, and perhaps perplexingly, Moscow 
ignored enlargement of the EU, which had to have further implications 
from the Russian perspective than accession of Poland and the Baltic 
States to NATO.
The tension between the Kremlin’s geopolitical and geo-economic 
preferences and the socio-economic interests of regions has been and 
still is clearly seen in the case of the north-western regions, especially 
Kaliningrad Oblast. This region, an enclave, which is distant from Moscow, 
is 70% dependent on dairy product supplies from Europe, 50% on fruits 
and vegetables, and 40% on poultry. The Russian goods embargo, which 
came from the EU, Norway, Australia, Canada, and the US, resulted in 
prices doubling on these goods, which led to them having to be important 
from other Russian regions. The Governor of Kaliningrad Oblast has tried 
to convince federal authorities to lift or at least mitigate the embargo, but 
this was to no avail. Some food importers even requested assistance from 
the Russian government, however, it was not provided. As a last resort, 
the embargo was bypassed with illegal forms and regional authorities 
obviously and silently appreciated these dealings (Golunov 2015).
Regions that are interested in international cooperation (especially 
local authority units) without the Kremlin’s support will not achieve any 
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success in this matter or will not take part in such cooperation. Regions 
are not able to harm the federal centre’s interests because there are 
many legal and political mechanisms which reduce such threats to zero. 
However federal centre policy may harm the interests of regions. In the 
Far East case, what causes the most harm are errors in strategic planning, 
lack of willingness to implement transport allowances, standardization in 
the approach to differentiation, and finally, colonial approach to the Far 
Eastern frontiers of Russia, which consists of exploitation connected to 
the lack of investment (Zykov 2007, 9–10).
In the case of the Russian North-western efforts, Andrey Makarychev 
recalls that federal authorities discouraged Kaliningrad Oblast to 
participate in the Niemen Euro-region. Joenniemi and Sergunin indicate 
a few examples of blocking unusually interesting initiatives in the north-
western part of Russia with Murmansk Oblast and Karelia as participants. 
The Kremlin “has sunk” the project of establishing an industrial park on 
the Russian-Finnish border between Imatra and Svetlogorsk. Furthermore, 
it “has sunk” establishing of the Pomor Special Economic Zone on the 
Norwegian-Russian border with Murmansk Oblast and the Sør Varanger 
commune (Joenniemi and Sergunin 2014, 22).
As you might expect, regions that were mostly interested in 
cooperation with West and North Europe were the ones who strongly 
criticized the federal centre’s policy, even their authorities have tried to 
protect the  interests of local societies and business entities, which was 
proved in the case of Kaliningrad Oblast. Regions have demonstrated 
their lack of appreciation and trust of the centre. It was emphasized that 
the extremely centralized and universal model of centre-regions relations 
should not have occupied regional international activity, because its 
attitude is unusually inflexible and ineffectual. Regions believe that the 
federal centre should revalue its attitude to regional paradiplomacy, in 
order to respond adequately to socio-economic challenges that the regions 
have to face, and it should understand and adjust to the glocalization 
phenomenon. The centre should adjust and adequately respond to the 
needs of regions (Joenniemi and Sergunin 2014, 30). However, the Far East 
regions claim that regional interests have an economic, and not political 
nature, if we consider international cooperation. There are no threats to 
the national interests of Russia, just the opposite: they provide security to 
them and thanks to international cooperation public tensions, which are 
financially motivated, are defused (Zykov 2007, 5).
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4.12. Conditions, institutionalization  
and internationalization level  
of the Far East regions
The Russian Far East operates in the framework of the Far Eastern 
Federal District administrative division. At 6,215,900 square kilometres, 
which covers 36.4% of Russian territory, and with a population of 
nearly 6.6 million it means its density is the lowest in Russia. Regional 
productivity level compared to Japan or the US or even to the Russian 
average is very low. The use of energy on a per-regional unit (Gross 
Regional Product, GRP) is twice as high as the Russian average. The 
contribution to the domestic economy is small, even though the state 
obtains 100% of tin, 98% of diamonds, 67% of gold, and 65% of fish 
resources taken from the area. The Far East covers 1/3 of the Russian 
territory, yet only has 13.8% of Russian railway lines and 9.5% of paved 
roadways. The population is successively decreasing (on the contrary to 
the other countries in this region) – in 2014, 25,000 people left the Far 
East. According to official sources in the first half of 2016 the territory of 
the Far East left approximately 2.7 thousand persons that is 4.2 times less 
than in the same period of 2015. (Human Development Report 2006/2007 
for the Russian Federation 2007, 96; Madej 2015, 92; S Dal’nego Vostoka 
v pervom polugodii uyekhali okolo 2,7 tysyach chelovek).
The development of the Far East is slower than in other Russian 
regions and people are facing a decrease in their wages. The difference 
between the increasing GDP in the Far East and Trans-Baikal in 2006 
was 22.9% to its disadvantage. To eliminate this difference the regional 
growth should be no lower than 6.5–9.2% per year when compared with 
other European regions. Inflation also poses a problem, because it lowers 
real income and increases differences between regions on both sides of 
the border. There is also a demographic problem at stake. In 1990–2010 
Siberia and the Russian Far East lost 3.6 million people. Moreover, the 
economic crisis caused by the US and EU sanctions, along with fuel 
oil prices falling, have worsened the situation of the Far East regions. 
A budget deficit, lower wages, and fall of social security have resulted in 
an additional rural exodus.
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4.12.1. Conditions and determinants of international 
activity of the Far East regions
The external environment of the Russian Far East is the rapidly 
developing Asia-Pacific region that generates more than half of the 
global GDP (54%), 43% of global trade (Yumaguzina 2015), and it is an 
active international player. It absolutely outdistanced Russia in taking 
integration initiatives. Admittedly, Russia is a founding member of the 
Shanghai Cooperation Organization and APEC, has cooperated with 
ASEAN since 1996, and has participated in the East Asia Summit since 
2011. However, since the second decade of the 21st century, Russia sees 
the region with a great interest and sees for itself a strategic value in this 
kind of international cooperation. 
The idea of strict socio-economic cooperation with the Asia-Pacific 
region is not new, but so far all attempts to include this region in East 
Asian integration processes end up in declarations. Nevertheless, this 
factor may potentially have great significance in the future from the 
international activity of the Far East regions’ perspective.
Geography also plays an essential role in affecting the international 
activity of this macro-region: the connection length with the capital 
(federal government headquarters) affects commodity prices due to 
transport tariffs and geographical location. The development of the Far 
East was based on trade with the use of geographical location and the 
accessibility of resources. When in the past it was supported first by tsarist 
authorities and then Soviet authorities, its economy was based on local 
initiative, trade cities and railway lines that supported trade and, at that 
time, its position among other regional players was strong. This factor lost 
its positive function when diplomatic relations between China and the 
Soviet Union declined. After the dissolution of the Soviet Union, foreign 
policy was liberalized. This meant that the trans-border processes were 
difficult to control, as they developed rapidly as in other parts of the world. 
The economic activity in the borderlands was rapid, brought immediate 
benefits, raised entrepreneurship, and motivated people as well as local 
authorities. On the other hand, the borderlands promoted the increase 
of illegal migration, expansion of the “grey economy,” and allowed for 
a greater range of smuggling. These pathologies could not have adequately 
been terminated in legal ways.
The Far East shares the longest border of 4,250 kilometres with China. 
The proximity of an advanced developing China should be considered 
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as beneficial for its development. Meanwhile, many expert opinions and 
academic publications provide a pessimistic image. Progressive political 
cooperation and close strategic relations do not provide effective economic 
cooperation – the federal government’s actions have not yet resulted 
in the desired effect, which means that they have not strengthened 
regions enough in order to make inter-regional cooperation with China 
advantageous to both sides.
Furthermore, in the general scheme of paradiplomacy, Kuznetsov 
puts the phenomenon which he calls the mechanism of solving central 
government dysfunction in state-building process and providing needs of 
local communities (regions support central government in foreign policy at 
free will or by force). In Russia it is clearly seen that interests of individual 
subjects and the federal centre are not entirely coordinated but often differ 
from each other. It hinders development and participation of the Far East 
in regional processes (Zykov 2012, 67). It is very important for central 
authorities to make such programs, which will be a crucial element in 
the strategy towards them, that will support the increase of external 
investment and foreign trade on these “lagging behind” subjects. It is 
clear to see that the central government dysfunction in the state-building 
process and providing needs of local communities affects the Russian Far 
East. The regional cooperation of the Far East regions is more connected 
with federal authorities’ policy (they stimulate it) than with their own 
activity. Since 2000, the centralization of decision-making process can be 
seen. Separatism may cause a threat but in the case of the Far East and 
Kaliningrad Oblast these threats have no sufficient justification.
In Kuznetsov’s model historical conditions of paradiplomacy 
development are not enlisted. The Authors claim that the regional 
international activity arose from their past experiences – skills and 
tradition in actions outside the country. This problem can be analysed in 
another negative way – past experiences may discourage the transfer of 
more power to the provinces. However, the Tsarist Russia extended rule 
in Siberia and the Russian Far East, which requires a broad discussion, 
are issues that cannot be analysed. Furthermore, it is worth noticing that 
in the 17th century, Russia interacted with the Chinese Empire during 
the Qing dynasty. The Russian land extension and further treaties that 
regulated relations with a collapsing China at that time caused disputes 
among both Russia and China and are responsible for creating the difficult 
Russian-China border conflict. The connection length with the capital 
of the Empire, the necessity of employing ethnic groups and natives, 
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caused a chance for region – it was able to create its own statehood or 
strong autonomy. Catherine II of Russia emphasized the independency 
of Siberia, but in 1796, Paul I abolished this independency. In 1920, 
there was an attempt to proclaim the Republic of the Far East, which 
is a great example of creating autonomy. The Republic would operate 
as a buffer state separating Russian territory against former Chinese 
territories controlled by the Japanese at that time. Natural resources, 
the construction of trade routes, especially the most spectacular Trans-
Siberian Railway at the end of the 19th Century and China-oriented 
trade, showed that the region started to have a greater autonomy 
than in past periods. It was probably a  political effort that supported 
revolutionary changes rather than creating independence and sovereignty 
state (Rossiyskiy Dal’niy Vostok 2014, 8).
4.12.2. The problem of internationalization of the Far East 
regions
The analysis of the statistics shows that despite the same legal terms, 
on which regional international activity is based on, there are differences 
in placing regions in the framework of one macro-region – some of them 
are more “internationalized” than others (see Table 4.1 and Annex 4). 
In the conducted research, a large part of the data is based on foreign 
figures and numbers: foreign investment, value of commodities, and 
number of tourists – general data as well as per capita. The research proves 
that Sakhalin Oblast, Khabarovsk Krai, and Primorsky Krai are the most 
internationalized. On the other hand, Chukotka Autonomous Okrug, 
Kamchatka Krai and Magadan Oblast are the least internationalized. The 
analysis of federal centre policy towards the Far East macro-region, which 
is analysed further, will help to give information regarding to what extent 
is the activity of regional authorities influencing on their (relatively) high 
level of internationalization, and to what extent is the result of central 
authorities influence on these important and long-range. It is also worth 
posing the question as to whether or not it is possible in the future for 
other regions of the Far East to improve their level of internationalization 
within the entire macro-region?
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4.13. Case studies – profile of international activity 
of regions with the highest level  
of internationalization
4.13.1. The Sakhalin Oblast
The geopolitical location helped the economic development of 
region. The Sakhalin Oblast develops the faster than other Far Eastern 
regions. Sakhalin GDP is RUB 647.8 billion, per capita RUB 1,316.3 
thousand – 2.8 more than the rate of the rest of Russia. Industry is based 
on three main sectors: fishing, forestry, and fossil fuels, in the last one 
the most important is oil extraction. This branch develops rapidly and 
in 2015 currently the industry accounts for 70.7% of GDP, when in 2006 
it accounted for 30.8% of GDP. In addition, natural gas and coal are also 
exploited. Alarmingly, in the mentioned industries there is 93.4% (72.9% 
in 2006) of extraction, but only 4.3% of processing (16.2% in 2006), 2.3% 
(10.9% in 2006) of production and sale. It can be noticed that the oil 
industry is the most important for Sakhalin’s development. At the present 
moment, the extraction of newly discovered sources of good-quality oil 
on Sakhalin Island has begun. There are 15 sources of oil and gas, and 
in terms of amount – eight are big and two are unique. Moreover, there 
is ongoing work on Sakhalin-1 and Sakhalin-2, which are also connected 
with oil extraction. Gas is another important raw material. Liquefied gas 
production has taken place for five years and is efficient on Asia-Pacific 
markets, amounting to 5% of global production of this raw material. In 
2014, the oil and gas condensate extraction was 14.5 million tons, gas 
– 28.2 billion cubic meters, petroleum-derived products – 54.1 thousand 
tons. In 2014, the liquefied gas production (in the framework of 
“Sakhalin-2”) was 10.7  million tons (Ministerstvo inostrannykh del 
Rossiyskoy Federatsii, Pasport Sakhalinskoy oblasti, 2015). In 2014, the 
sale of oil and gas condensate was 14.4 million tons, of which 12.8 million 
tons were export-oriented. In 2014, in Sakhalin Oblast 4,541 thousand 
tons of coal were extracted, which is 704.6 thousand tons more than in 
2013. In 2014, the export of coal amount to 3,183.7 thousand tons, of 
which 3,134 thousand tons was sent abroad. The largest importers are 
Japan – 781.0, China –  1,055. 3, and Korea – 1,297.7 thousand tons, 
respectively.
The Sakhalin infrastructure is well developed. Considering the oblast’s 
location, maritime transport provides 66% of regional trade with Kholmsk 
Małgorzata Pietrasiak, Michał Słowikowski176
and Korsakov being the main trading ports. The Sakhalin transportation 
infrastructure consists of 8 ports, 11 terminals, which are part of the 
ports, passenger ferry service, and the Khomsk-Vanino sea railway. There 
are also seven airports in Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk, Okha, Yuzhno-Kurilsk, 
Shakhtiersk, Nogliki, Zonalnoye, Iturup and six helicopter landing pads. In 
December 2013, Vladimir Putin signed the bill through which all airports 
are at the jurisdiction of Sakhalin Oblast. The government of Sakhalin is 
planning further construction, reconstruction, and modernization of its 
airports, which will cost RUB 7,783 billion and will be funded with oblast 
budget funds. Therefore, as well as inter-Russian connections, the airports 
also handle the Asia-Pacific region: Sapporo, Tokyo, Harbin, and Seoul. 
Considering the Sakhalin oil and gas infrastructure, pipeline transport, 
e.g. the pipeline located between Northern Sakhalin and Komsomolsk-on-
Amur is 1.3 thousand kilometres length and is used to transport oil and 
gas, plays an important role. In Sakhalin Oblast the fishing industry, after 
the raw materials industry, is second in the hierarchy. The huge wealth of 
Sakhalin Oblast is its forest, which covers 82.2% of region.
In 2014, regional trade amounted to USD 18 billion, of which 
export was at 92.8% and import at 7.2%. The balance was positive at 
USD 15.4  billion (in 2013 – USD 15.8 billion). Sakhalin cooperates 
mostly with states of the Asia-Pacific region. Japan’s share is 43.4%, 
South Korea – 40.2%, and China – 9.8%. The fuel-energy complex has 
the largest share in exports at 95.7%. In 2014, 12.8 million tons of fuel, 
which cost USD 10.6 billion, were exported. The huge oil importers are 
South Korea (57.8%), Japan (29.0%) and China (13.2%). As for liquefied 
gas, “Sahhalin-2” provides this natural resource. The remaining export 
products are: coal (1%) as well as fish and sea products (3.1%). The 
main importers are Japan (81%), South Korea (16.1%) and China (1.4%). 
Import remains one of the main investment resources and helps in the 
development of the upstream sector.
As for investment, considering the geographic location and specificity 
of natural and climatic conditions, Sakhalin’s assets are: 1) natural 
resources: oil, gas, coal, water and forest conditions; 2) tourist conditions 
and the presence of unique biotopes; and 3) geographical location 
– proximity to the Asia-Pacific region.
Compared with other subjects of the Far East, Sakhalin is the undisputed 
leader in investment. Sakhalin-1 and Sakhalin-2 and of course the oil-gas 
industry, are the most important ones, attracting 66–75% of all investments 
coming to the region. There are currently 82 planned investments involving 
177The International Activity of Federal Subjects of the Russian Federation...
private capital, estimated to cost RUB 2.1 trillion. These investments are 
supported by state policy, moreover, in 2010 an agreement On the Sakhalin 
Oblast Support for Investment Agreement was adopted which provides 
granting credits and subsidies, support in organizational and information 
aspects, tax exemptions, and budgetary funds.
As for foreign direct investment (FDI), the FDI value was USD 
44.9  billion on January 1, 2013. The main investor states were: the 
Netherlands (79.2% FDI general value), Japan (7.5%), Bahamas (6.6%), 
and India (4.7%). The primary target investment sector was the oil-energy 
sector (98.1% FDI total) (Ministerstvo inostrannykh del Rossiyskoy 
Federatsii, Otchet o mezhdunarodnykh i vneshneekonomicheskikh 
svyazyakh po linii Pravitel’stva i oblastnykhorganov ispolnitel’noy vlasti 
Sakhalinskoy oblasti, 2013). At the same time, further development 
of regional cooperation with neighbours should be connected with the 
development of investment potential.
Considering regional internationalization, the annual conference 
on Sakhalin’s Oil and Gas, organized in Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk, is a very 
important initiative. The forum is organized by the Adam Smith Institute, 
and companies and ministries from Russia, the Netherlands, China, Korea, 
Japan and the Far East regions participate in this conference (Ministerstvo 
inostrannykh del Rossiyskoy Federatsii, O mezhdunarodnoy koferentsii 
„Neft’ i gaz Sakhalina”, 2015)
Japan is the most significant trade partner for Sakhalin Oblast. The 
Russian MOFA report shows that in 2013 many events that deepen 
cooperation took place, e.g. the 19th Far East-Hokkaido common plenary 
meeting; 14th Consultative Board on The Sakhalin Oblast and Hokkaido 
Prefecture Friendship Economic Cooperation Agreement which provides 
a five-year plan of cooperation; dialogue concerning a visa-free regime 
between the Kuril Islands and Japanese inhabitants; and meetings between 
Sakhalin and Hokkaido Prefecture citizens. On April 22–24, 2013, the 
region was presented in Tokyo, which was a very important event. It was 
the third event since 2010 that had taken place in Asia-Pacific countries 
with Russian MOFA, business, and regional authorities representatives. 
During the event the Japan-Europe transcontinental connection through 
Sakhalin Island was presented.
South Korea is the second most important partner. In 2013, both sides 
had talks about transport cooperation and Sakhalin concluded an agreement 
with the Korean Transport Institute on transport development concept 
concerning not only air transport, but also road and rail transport – this 
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included a bus route from Selikhino, Khabarovsk Krai to Nysh, Sakhalin. 
This line would provide a positive impulse for the Oblast’s development 
and commodity transport to the Asia-Pacific region. According to Russia, 
the most important joint motion is building a Perinatology Centre in 
Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk with help from Korean capital . Russia and Korea also 
cooperate on humanitarian and scientific affairs – the most interesting 
one is the common debate of both MOFAs on the fate of Koreans who 
were exiled to Sakhalin by the Japanese.
4.13.2. Khabarovsk Krai
In Khabarovsk Krai there are four accredited diplomatic missions. 
These include Japan and the People’s Republic of China’s Consulate-
Generals, the Embassy Agency of the Republic of Belarus, and the 
Economic Advisory Agency of the Embassy of the Democratic People’s 
Republic of Korea. China is the trade leader and main partner of 
Khabarovsk Krai, followed by Korea, Japan, Thailand, the Philippines, 
Vietnam, and Singapore. Western countries such as Germany, Cyprus, 
and the US are also trade partners. Khabarovsk cooperates with six twin 
cities: Niigata (Japan), Portland (US), Victoria (Canada), Harbin (PRC), 
Bucheon (Republic of Korea), and Sanya (PRC).
As for the regional natural resources, these include: forest (Khabarovsk 
Krai is third in wood production in Russia) and natural resources – (third 
in precious metals production). Khabarovsk Krai has reserves of platinum 
– 50% of all Russia’s reserves, gold – 8%, lead – 20%, copper – 50% and coal 
– 7.5%. There are also rare metals, gemstones, and thermal water. Tungsten, 
oil and gas were also discovered and will be exploited; in Khabarovsk Krai 
fish resources are third in terms of volume in the Far East.
The transport system plays a significant role in the Far East and in 
Russia. There are two important railways in Khabarovsk Krai: the Trans-
Siberian Railway and the Baikal-Amur Mainline, which provide the access 
to trading ports in the Pacific Ocean. Vanino is the main trade port. The 
technical conditions allow for the unloading of 10 million tons of cargo 
per year. The SUEK company utilizes the terminal, which is used to reload 
12 million tons of coal per year. In Khabarovsk there is an important 
(transit) airport that connects Russia with America and Asia-Pacific 
countries (China, Korea, Japan). This location allows the region to plan 
significant investment connected with the development of Khabarovsk 
metropolitan area and the development of the Vanino-Sovetskaya Gavan 
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transport node, which in future may connect Europe and the Asia-Pacific 
region. Here – on the basis of the Sovetskaya Gavan port – came to life the 
first economic port zone, which provides port services, constructing ships 
and containers, as well as the development of fish and sea food processing. 
Businessmen, who are treated with special conditions, including tax 
exemption, work here. There is also a duty-free zone.
Considering investment, Khabarovsk Krai is one of the most attractive 
subjects of the Far East. There is a special program supporting the 
investment development, which provides tax exemption and the credit 
guarantees of regional government. There is also an agency specialized in 
canvassing foreign investors.
In contrast to Sakhalin Oblast whose extractive industry is dominant, 
Khabarovsk Krai has a well-developed processing industry, which is 60% 
of total industry production. Khabarovsk Krai produces one-quarter of the 
Far East industry production. The largest share of industry production in 
Khabarovsk Krai are: machinery– 33%, fuel-energy– 23%, metallurgical– 
18%, forest and wood processing– 13%, and agricultural– 13%.
In 2009, trade amounted to USD 1.65 trillion. The main trade partners 
are China, Japan and South Korea. Their share in regional commodity 
exchange is 70%. As for investment, in the 2005–2009 period these three 
countries amount to USD 1,196.2 million – 2.8 times more than in the 
1989–2004 period. At the moment there are 600 companies with share of 
foreign capital, mainly in extractive, transport and processing industries. 
There is also a well-developed market for services.
Khabarovsk Krai tries to provide suitable investment conditions for 
foreign capital and among instruments supporting the canvass of FDI there 
are: agency, which is the first one in the Far East, that provides creating 
and monitoring suitable conditions for investment; sustaining direct 
relations with foreign contractors; establishing of an Advisory Council as 
an open dialogue with foreign investors; concluding the On Khabarovsk 
Krai Investment Activity Agreement, which provides uniform investment 
rules for Russian and foreign investors; organizing meetings, forums and 
international conferences; and publishing in Japanese, Chinese, and Korean 
bulletins about regional investment conditions (Ministerstvo inostrannykh 
del Rossiyskoy Federatsii, Паспорт Хабаровского Края, 2014).
China is the most important economic partner of Khabarovsk Krai. 
The dialogues are about mutual cooperation concerning construction 
projects, exchange of information in the framework of the Coordination 
Council, interregional and cross-border exchanges, and dinghy crossings 
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on the Amur. Russia invites China to cooperate in: constructing 
the mining-metallurgical cluster in the Amur territory, extraction 
of resources, wood processing, furniture production, as well as the 
agricultural and food industry. Russia emphasizes trade and business 
cooperation interest but comments on the relatively small investment 
activity from China(Ministerstvo inostrannykh del Rossiyskoy Federatsii, 
O mezhdunarodnykh svyazyakh i vneshneekonomicheskoydeyatel’nosti 
Khabarovskogo kraya i Yevreyskoy avtonomnoy oblasti, 2013). The 
Russian-Chinese EXPO in Harbin plays a significance role in bilateral 
trade relations. In 2014, it held a meeting between the Ministry 
of Development and Foreign Relations of Khabarovsk Krai and the 
Investment and Development Agency of Khabarovsk Krai with authorities 
of Yanbian Korean Autonomous Prefecture in Jilin Province. In 2013, 
Chinese investments amounted to USD 13 million.
Khabarovsk Krai cooperates also with the Republic of Korea, with 
trade amounting to 20.4% of the total regional trade. Korean investments 
are subordinate only to Chinese investments. The most significant 
Korean investment in the region will be the modernization of Khabarovsk 
airport. Korea and Khabarovsk Krai also cooperate in modern medicine 
techniques. There is also some small cooperation with the Democratic 
People’s Republic of Korea – 15 companies with North Korean capital, 
located in the region. It is considered to invite 2 thousand Koreans to work 
in Khabarovsk Krai (Ministerstvo inostrannykh del Rossiyskoy Federatsii, 
O mezhdunarodnykh svyazyakh i vneshneekonomicheskoydeyatel’nosti 
Khabarovskogo kraya i Yevreyskoy avtonomnoy oblasti, 2014).
In Khabarovsk Krai almost half of all investment are from the EU 
member states. Two countries above all are interested in Khabarovsk 
Krai: Sweden (there are plans to open a representative of a company 
which provides road-constructing techniques) and France. France 
cooperates as effectively as possible in plane construction (e.g. Russian 
Saturn and French Snecma Moteurs cooperate to produce the Sukhoi 
Superjet 100 engines). The Russian, Belorussian and Kazakh customs 
union provides interests to cooperate with Kazakhstan. The US 
investments are not huge – USD 25 million, however, before 2014 there 
were talks that were to revive the US investment spirit. These talks are 
currently suspended and are as a result of the annexation of Crimea by 
the Russian Federation.
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4.13.3. Primorsky Krai
In Primorsky Krai there are 226 companies of the extractive industry, 
4,899 companies of the processing industry, production and distribution 
of electric energy, gas, and water. The most competitive are the forest, 
wood processing, food (mainly fishing), coloured metallurgy, chemical, 
and oil industries. As for natural resources, Primorsky Krai boasts: lead, 
lead-zinc ores, tungsten, coal and lignite, peat, and building materials. 
The main industry is based on construction and renovation of ships as 
well as the extraction of resources.
In 2014, trade in Primorsky Krai amounted to USD 12,917.8 billion, 
export was USD 5,260.4 million and import was USD 7,657.4 million. The 
important trade partners are China – 49.2% (export USD 2,423.9 million, 
import USD 3,935.9 million), Republic of Korea – 15.3% (export USD 
1,059.4 million, import USD 927.3 million), and Japan – 15% (export 
USD 308.9 million, import USD 1,638.3 million).
The main export-oriented products of Primorsky Krai are: mineral 
products – 68.8%, food and agricultural products – 18.9%, wood and 
woodworks – 7.2%, metals and metal products – 3.6%, and means of 
transport – 0.71%. The main import-oriented products are: machines, 
equipment and means of transport – 49.2%, food – 13.2%, chemical 
products – 10%, as well as metals and metal products – 8%. Transport, 
connection, agriculture, forest industry, processing industry and trade 
were popular areas of investment. The most prospective domains are 
transport, connection, oil industry, forest industry, and wood processing 
industry.
Until 2013, the Program of Vladivostok Development as a Centre 
of Asia-Pacific Region was adopted in the framework of the Program of 
the Far East and Trans-Baikal Socio-Economic Development. The APEC 
summit took place in Vladivostok in 2012. Russia took this opportunity 
to build two large cable-stayed bridges – the Zolotoy Bridge across the 
Zolotoy Rog and the Russky Island Bridge, which connects the mainland 
with the Russky Island and is the longest cable-stayed bridge in the world. 
The organization of the APEC summit in Vladivostok cost some USD 
20 trillion (RUB 670 trillion) (Ministerstvo inostrannykh del Rossiyskoy 
Federatsii Pasport Primorskogo kraya, 2013).
Primorsky Krai has signed nine agreements and three memorandums 
of friendship and cooperation with Chinese, Japanese, and Mongolian 
provinces. Vladivostok is a twin city of San Diego, Tacoma, Juneau (USA), 
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Niigata, Akita and Hakodate (Japan), Dalian (China), Busan (South Korea), 
Wonsan (North Korea), Manta (Ecuador), Kota Kinabalu (Malaysia), 
Yanbian (Yanbian Korean Autonomous Prefecture in China) However, 
constant cooperation has not been provided (Ministerstvo inostrannykh 
del Rossiyskoy Federatsii, Pasport Primorskogo kraya, 2013). There are 
six accredited Consulate-Generals: Vietnam, the Democratic People’s 
Republic of Korea, the Republic of Korea, the USA, Japan, and one agency of 
PRC’s Consulate-General; 2 Consulates – Australia and Canada, in which 
Honorary Consuls are in charge, 12 Honorary Consulates: Bangladesh, 
the United Kingdom, New Zealand, Thailand, the Philippines, Chile, 
South Africa, Germany, Laos, South Ossetia, Malaysia, and Indonesia. 
There is also a representative of the European Bank for Reconstruction 
and Development. In 2014, Vladivostok was visited by the ambassadors 
of Germany, New Zealand, Latvia, India, Luxemburg, Slovakia, Ecuador, 
Guatemala, and Uruguay, as well as the EU Special Representative, 
delegation of diplomats of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, 
Deputy Ambassador of Australia, Counsellor of the Embassy of Denmark, 
Minister of Trade and Industry of Singapore, and Deputy Prime Minister 
of Vietnam.
Primorsky Krai provides strict connections with Japanese prefectures 
(Niigata, Hokkaido, Akita, Toyama, Kyoto), Chinese provinces 
(Heilongjiang and Jilin), South Korea (Gangwon province), and North 
Korea (North Hamgyong province). Taking into consideration Japanese 
delegations, it is clear to see that Japan wants to maintain the current level 
of relations, however, Japan does not plan new initiatives. China mainly 
supports the development of logistics and agriculture (the most prospective 
cooperation areas). South Korea often discusses the inconvenient topic 
about establishing a Korean Autonomous Unit, which is an obstacle in 
the further development of Primorsky Krai and South Korean relations 
(Ministerstvo inostrannykh del Rossiyskoy Federatsii, Pasport Primorskogo 
kraya, 2013). However, there are more contacts with North Korea, which 
are often in the framework of transit. In general, from 2013 to 2014 there 
were 40 visits, meetings and initiatives on the international level and 
113 on the regional administrative level (Ministerstvo inostrannykh del 
Rossiyskoy Federatsii, Pasport Primorskogo kraya, 2013) .
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4.14. Geopolitical dimension of the far eastern 
policy of the federal centre
The international activity of the Far East regions is more and more 
dominated (stimulated) by the federal centre’s actions and is subdued to 
accomplish certain goals, both in foreign policy and in domestic policy. Both 
aspects are connected with each other and cannot be treated separately. 
This macro-region can boast its longstanding tradition considering the 
centre’s influence and attempts to plan its development.
The strategy of planned economic development of the macro-region 
began in the 1930s, when the Soviet Union was preparing for war against 
Germany and was building its military potential. At that time, significant 
resources were allocated to the development of the defence industry, which 
also led to the extraction industry being developed at the same time. After 
World War II the situation was more stable and the Soviet Union positively 
tried to attract foreign capital, mainly from Japan, and tried to develop 
border trade. It should be emphasized that all projects, according to single 
plan, were controlled by the state. During the conflict with China, the 
interest of the Far East was developed by the centre, however, five-year 
plans concerning this region were not achieved. In the second half of the 
1980s there was an attempt to establish a development model from the 
1920s and 1930s in the Far East when economic and social development 
were perceived as a chance to cooperate with Asia. The beginnings of the 
disintegration processes in the USSR and deep economic crisis doomed 
that plan to failure. 
At the end of the 1980s, Soviet scientists created their own concepts 
of economic policy and relations between federal government and regions. 
The resources sector had to be the basis for economic development. 
Then again, relations with regions were strict and the geographical 
aspect – border location – had to help. The attractive conditions should 
have attracted domestic migration. At that moment, it was claimed that 
separatisms, decentralized trends in the Soviet Union, were permanently 
irreversible, and that the region would able to take care of migrants. 
Thus, the region would develop – the Far East and Trans-Baikal areas 
would become attractive for representatives of other nationalities. The 
defence sector along with the resource sector, was important considering 
the development of the Far East. The abovementioned plan contained the 
opportunity to develop independent cooperation with East Asia – both in 
the framework of the Federation and the international system. The plan 
Małgorzata Pietrasiak, Michał Słowikowski184
did not work due to the crisis that the Soviet Union and then the Russian 
Federation fell into. However, that period is characterized by enhanced 
individual activity, development of border trade, open borders, and a visa-
free regime with China. The visa-free regime between China and Russian 
cross-border areas was abolished in 1994. It resulted in rapid and drastic 
reduction in trade, e.g. in Khabarovsk Krai – 7.5% decline, Amur Oblast 
– 5.5% decline, and Primorsky Krai – 3.6% decline since 1992.
In 1996, Boris Yeltsin signed a document which the charted rules 
of implementation of the government program of development of the 
Far East between 1996–2005. On the basis of that concept was the 
assumption that the Far East should develop as a special economic zone. 
So special instruments that would boost economic development had to be 
created. The idea was not implemented as the region did not have its own 
resources – it was dependent on federal government policy, which at that 
time was neglecting relations with Japan, Korea, and ASEAN members, 
concentrating rather on diplomatic relations with the EU.
Technically, region “collapsed”. Between 1989–2010, 20% of the 
Far East population left the region. To prevent further migration, it was 
proposed to use more money from the federal budget on healthcare and 
education. However, according to public opinion polls, 40% of population 
wants to leave. The financial crisis inhibited the funding of projects 
adopted within the framework of The Program of the Far East and Trans-
Baikal Socio-Economic Development to 2013. They were reduced by 
62%, except for the preparation of Vladivostok for APEC summit. In 
2013, another federal program was adopted – The Far East and Trans-
Baikal Socio-Economic Development Strategy to 2025. An agreement was 
also signed with China about cooperation between the Russian Far East, 
East Siberia, and Chinese North-eastern regions within 2009–2018. The 
program implementation was coordinated with the Far East and Trans-
Baikal development strategy. In The Russian Federation Energy Strategy to 
2030 many projects are mentioned which may have influence on regional 
economic development.
Natalia Zubarevich emphasizes that the Far East case shows that 
in modern Russia along with two classical models (mechanisms) of 
regional development policy: centralistic and compensatory (considering 
compensating levels of economic development as a primary political 
goal), decentralized and pro-competitive (considering boosting regional 
competitive ability as a regional policy primary goal (Hausner 2001, 
9)) a third geopolitical model exists. This third model is interpreted as 
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a  “mechanism that is supposed to preserve territorial integrity of state 
and strengthen control over regions that are strategically important” 
(Zubarevich 2015, 1–2). Nevertheless, as Zubarevich notices, this 
mechanism provides state governing using geopolitics from the 21st 
century – in the first decade of this century, this model has had a priority 
for Russia. “In order to implement geopolitical priorities, there can be used 
compensating and competitive instruments, however, if geopolitics is a goal 
itself, the mentioned mechanisms have supportive and additional nature 
– political decisions are undertaken to stand up against the disintegration 
of state and preserve control over selected regions” (Zubarevich 2015, 2).
The previous attempts of macro-region modernization, which included 
many ambitious investments, have not had the anticipated effects. Also 
the latest governmental attempts to boost development of the macro-
region, which were mentioned, had to wait for changes in the political 
and economic situation. These programs are: The Program of the Far East 
and Trans-Baikal Socio-Economic Development to 2013, The Far East and 
Trans-Baikal Socio-Economic Development Strategy to 2025 (Pravitel’stvo 
Rossiyskoy Federatsii, Strategiya sotsial’no-ekonomicheskogo razvitiya 
Dal’nego Vostoka i Baykal’skogo regiona, 2013), The Program of the Far 
East and East Siberia of the Russian Federation and the Northeastern 
Regions of the People’s Republic of China Cooperation in 2009–2018.
There is no doubt that the Western states’ sanctions were the catalyst 
of the new approach to socio-economic regional development. The conflict 
with the West (with a particular mention of Ukraine) resulted that the East, 
mainly China, was perceived as the most prospective Russian partner on 
international area. Vladimir Putin as a “main playmaker” left his euro-
centrism, according to Alexander Gabuev, and permanently accepted the 
important role of the Asian (Chinese) vector in political and socio-economic 
development in Russia in the foreseeable future (Gabuev 2015).
The macro-region has been strengthened in institutional the 
hinterland of regional modernization, with the participation of foreign 
investors. In Khabarovsk the special Ministry of the Far East Development 
(Ministerstvo po razvitiyu Dal’nego Vostoka) was established in 2012. In 
2014, the analogous ministries were established in Crimea and Northern 
Caucasus, and the Agency for Canvassing Investment and Supporting 
Export in the Far East was established on the basis of it.
Regions of the Russian Far East in the framework of the new 
(geopolitically determined) approach, benefit from compensatory model 
used by federal centre. It is mostly connected with the difficulties faced due 
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to the implementation of investment projects (further on in the chapter). 
Its modernization is happening both thanks to budgetary funds of the 
Development and Foreign Economic Cooperation Bank (Bank razvitiya 
i vneshneekonomicheskoydeyatel’nosti) as well as state companies’ 
investments.
The Far East is the second largest beneficiary of the federal budget, 
however, the North Caucasian Federal District, which is another 
geopolitically important macro-region for the Kremlin, “treads on its 
toes.” In 2008–2014, the Far East’s participation in general subsidies from 
the federal budget was not below 11%, in 2014, the macro-region was 
given 12.2% of total expenditures from the federal budget to implement 
regional policy. At the same time, the Northern Caucasus was given 12.3% 
of total expenditures. As a consequence, it gave the following amounts: 
RUB 243 trillion in 2013 and RUB 211 trillion in 2014 (Zubarevich 2015, 
6). The federal budget funds were used to implement preparations for 
APEC summit in Vladivostok.
The representatives of federal government, in the framework of new 
development actions of the macro-region, have made bold statements 
that it was considered as a priority for Russia, and that is why it required 
special investment (Yumaguzina 2015). Vladimir Putin’s statement on 
that matter, which was delivered during the Federal Assembly on December 
2013, was the formal confirmation of the centre’s determination to 
construct and implement a new development model of the Far East “on 
rules of strict integrity and development of economic and trade relations 
with Asia-Pacific states.” The reconstruction of Siberia and the Far East 
was announced as a national priority for the 21st century (Pravitel’stvo 
Rossiyskoy Federatsii, Proyekt Federal’nogo zakona O territoriyakh 
operezhayushchego sotsial’no-ekonomicheskogorazvitiya, 2014).
Federal officials have found an excellent formula that translates 
the necessity of the intensification of efforts for economic development 
of the Far East. The structural “weaknesses” of the macro-region were 
hidden, and at the same time, its unused potential was emphasized. The 
current geopolitical motivation to financially support the macro-region, 
which had a negative basis (China threat), has been modified. Now it has 
a positive basis – the macro-region still is a problem for Russia, however, 
if its potential is properly used, its geo-economic specificity will become 
an asset, which will be beneficially utilized by state.
Above all else, it is a unique region (apart from the socio-economic 
problems that it has had since the beginning of the 1990s), it connects the 
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two great Eastern-Western civilizations and plays the role of the “Eastern 
gates of Russia.” According to Alexander Galushka, the Chief of the 
Ministry for Development of the Russian Far East (Minvostokrazvitiya), 
the life-blood of global economy in the 21st century will be the Asia-Pacific 
region and the development of the Russian Far East is an inseparable 
part of this process. The cooperation with regional states may provide 
investment boom in Russia. It will be beneficial for Russia, because some 
of them have access to new technologies or significant industry and 
financial potential. The majority of regional states did not join the anti-
Russian sanctions but simultaneously were interested in enlarging their 
influence. The Far East has a unique chance of becoming and integral 
institute that will connect the West with the East (Yumaguzina 2015). 
The region had to be properly infrastructurally prepared for the 
investment influx. The two transport corridors, “Primor’ye –1” and 
“Primor’ye –2,” which cost RUB 200 trillion (Yumaguzina 2015), are 
good examples of these endeavours, as are the infrastructure investments, 
construction of the pipeline through “Transneft,” which provides 
cooperation with Eastern customers, and finally the modernization of 
the Baikal-Amur Mainline (BAM), which cost RUB 300 trillion (funded 
by Russian Railways Company), which will increase its capacity and will 
make rods to seaports (Zubarevich 2015, 6).
At the same time, many administrative and practical actions were 
adopted for canvassing domestic and foreign investors. First and foremost, 
“the institution of accelerated growth area” (territoriy operezhayushchego 
razvitiya [TOR]), was stabled, which was called a “modern and reasonable 
system of preferences for investors” in selected regions of the Far East. It 
had to include: de-bureaucracy of business actions, tax exemptions, and 
investment protection. A similar basis was a must for the free-port zone 
project in Vladivostok. There was an assumption that investors would 
be provided tax exemptions, customs tax, and visa simplifications. The 
mechanism of a free-port zone should have been similar to the TOR 
Institution. There were plans to increase the concept of free-port zone to 
all important ports located in the Southern Far East: from Zarubino to 
Nakhodka (Yumaguzina 2015). In 2016, it was published that free-port 
zone will be established in Chukotka Autonomous Okrug, Kamchatka 
Krai and Sakhalin Oblast (Kryuchkova and Sapozhkov and Yedovina 
2016). All these actions were accompanied by promotional endeavours 
like the APEC summit or Eastern Business Forum.
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4.15. Centralized-coordinative model due  
to the Russian Far East
The roots of the current, centralized, magisterial and uncompromising 
approach to the macro-region might be in the experiences of centre-regions 
relations from the 1990s, with the special involvement of Primorsky Krai. 
Yevgeny Nazdratenko, the longstanding Governor of Primorsky Krai, is 
partially responsible for the disastrous regional condition. In the mid-
1990s, he effectively blocked the free-market modernization process 
in the region and its internationalization process, which was initiated 
by Vladimir Kuznetsov, by the establishing well-developed patronal-
clientelistic system, PAKT. This system united representatives of 
36 important regional companies. In addition, Nazdratenko is known as 
an anti-Chinese politician who counteracts against the Russian-Chinese 
approach (Alexseev 2002, 7–8).
There is no doubt that there is a clear relation between the geopolitical 
approach to the implementation of regional policy due to selected regions 
and of centralized-coordinative model, or statism in Kremlin’s approach 
to regions’ international activity) due to centre-regions relations in regard 
to international activity of the latter. Zubarevich notices that ministries 
such as the Ministry for the Far East Development should implement 
boosting policy in cooperation with both domestic and foreign investors 
and should strictly cooperate with regional authorities. However, the 
reality is quite different.
Instrumentalism in the centre’s approach to regions is manifested 
in many levels and it surely is connected to either geopolitical regional 
specificity, All-Russian political and socio-economic trends, and finally, 
the abovementioned negative experiences in centre-regions relations. 
What is most important, is that the centre has at its disposal mechanisms 
of enforcing acquiescence on regional authorities. However, it does not 
mean they are effective in terms of achieving the centre’s goals, even when 
they cooperate with regions.
  The macro-region was repeatedly under pressure from the central 
government. The pressure had to eliminate competitive subjects for 
domestic manufacturers from the Russian market. In 2004–2005, the 
centre conducted informal pressure on the Governors of the Far East 
to eliminate Chinese businessmen in cross-border regions. It was done 
with the knowledge that it will negatively affect local economies. The 
centre claimed that budget revenues (and their generous re-distribution) 
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would reduce public tensions in the Far East. And it was not wrong. The 
revenues of pension resources has helped the centre to mitigate the shock 
of the “grey zone” shutdown in the macro-region. This zone included the 
import of cars and trucks from outside (mainly from Japan), fishing, and 
wood industries. The Far East was given huge funds – in 2007 Khabarovsk 
Krai was given more in one year than it had received during 10 years when 
the Program of the Far East and the Trans-Baikal Development was in 
force (Blyakher and Vasil’yeva 2009, 68). The abovementioned the “grey 
zone” phenomenon requires great carefulness in dealing with the problem 
of regional internationalization in the Far East – its significant part can 
get out of any data.
At the beginning of the new decade, the federal centre undertook 
actions for further institutionalization of coordinated-cooperation model 
with regions in international cooperation and international economic 
cooperation. In 2001, guided by The Concept of the Russian Federation 
Foreign Policy the Russian MOFA determined its priorities in this area 
in “Asian and the Far Eastern regions” (Ministerstvo inostrannykh del 
Rossiyskoy Federatsii, Kontseptsiya raboty MID Rossii po koordinatsii 
mezhdunarodnykh i vneshneekonomicheskikhsvyazey sub’’yektov 
Rossiyskoy Federatsii, 2001). These were: actions to enlarge cooperation 
between Russian regions and partners in China and Japan as an integral part 
of Russian cooperation with these countries and actions providing solutions 
to socio-economic problems of Siberia and the Far East (Ministerstvo 
inostrannykh del Rossiyskoy Federatsii, Kontseptsiya raboty MID Rossii 
po koordinatsii mezhdunarodnykh i vneshneekonomicheskikhsvyazey 
sub’’yektov Rossiyskoy Federatsii, 2001). So, the idea to “harness” the 
outside to the modernization of the eastern border of Russia is not new.
Due to the Russian regions of the Far East, especially, these bordering 
with China, there is a common belief that Yury Trutnev, the Deputy 
Prime Minister of Russia and Presidential Envoy to the Far Eastern Federal 
District is in charge of their international activity. Trutnev was a curator 
of the Eastern Business Forum organized in Vladivostok in 2015. The 
regional territory is used to implement “great geopolitical projects” by the 
centre. Through the territory of the Far Eastern Federal District there are, 
inter alia, hydrocarbons transport networks, which are responsible for 
creating strategic partnership with China.
The regional authorities are still an important element in the 
modernization and internationalization process in the macro-region, even 
if they are presented with a fait accompli by the centre. Unfortunately, the 
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regions are the weakest link for implementation of this process. Gabuev 
emphasizes that regions’ attitude and involvement are important to 
succeed in business endeavours and projects of trans-border cooperation, 
which are approved on the authority level. The Program of the Russian 
Far Eastern and Chinese Northeastern Regions Regional Cooperation 
concluded by Dmitry Medvedev and Hu Jintao in 2009 (Pravitel’stvo 
Rossiyskoy Federatsii, Programma sotrudnichestva mezhdu regionami, 
2009), failed in the end due to the regions, more than 100 projects were 
not achieved (Gabuev 2015).
Regional activity in the international area is undertaken with strict 
cooperation with the centre. The Kremlin supervises the activity of 
regional authorities in the international area and is also a supervisor of 
their international cooperation. The best example of mechanisms that 
rule the Russian paradiplomacy is The Program of the Far East and East 
Siberia of the Russian Federation and the Northeastern Regions of the 
People’s Republic of China Cooperation in 2009–2018.
On September 23, 2009, leaders of both states agreed on The 
Program of the Far East and East Siberia of the Russian Federation and 
the Northeastern Regions of the People’s Republic of China Cooperation 
in 2009–2018. In this document there are 205 joint projects. It was 
assumed that the coordination of development plans of trans-border 
regions would be the main goal to achieve. One of them is The Far East 
and the Trans-Baikal Economic and Social Development to 2013 and the 
second one is The Program of the Northeastern China Revival. In the 
program there are many actions connected with opening border posts, 
constructing roads, bridges and railways, humanitarian cooperation, 
environment protection, creating special scientific-technical cooperation 
areas, exchange of employees and tourism. The mentioned program has to 
boost international cooperation of the Far East regions (which differ from 
other Russian regions due to their dynamism) and supports governmental 
programs of the Far East’s modernization. At that time, this region had 
been collapsing, suffering from depopulation, its citizens suffered from 
power cuts and interruptions of heating supplies, in spite of putting down 
as being strategically significant by the Kremlin in the process of geo-
economic integrity between Russia and Northeast Asian states (Karaganov 
et al. 2014, 6–7). Preparation and implementation of the program provide 
exemplifications of the many negative aspects that grieve the centralized 
approach to animation attempts of regional international cooperation. 
Simultaneously, its previous results are the example of existing strong 
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interest divergences between Russia and China in economic cooperation 
(Pravitel’stvo Rossiyskoy Federatsii, Programma sotrudnichestva mezhdu 
regionami, 2009; Assotsiatsiya ekonomicheskogo vzaimodeystviya 
sub’’yektov Rossiyskoy Federatsii “Dal’niy Vostok i Zabaykal’ye”, 
Informatsiya o khode realizatsii Programmy 2014).
First of all, it should be mentioned that The Program of the Far East 
and East Siberia of the Russian Federation and the Northeastern Regions 
of the People’s Republic of China Cooperation in 2009–2018 should boost 
contacts between the regions of both states. It was arranged at the central 
level and, from the Russian perspective, it was subordinated to implement 
tasks, which had been formulated by the Russian federal government, 
i.e.  supporting the implementation of regional policy in the framework 
of The Far East and the Trans-Baikal Economic and Social Development. 
The program’s investment and infrastructural character was clearly and 
strongly emphasized – from the intensification of trade between Russia 
and China’s perspective, development of border crossings and connections 
with China are treated as priority, however, currently it is absolutely 
inadequate and disproportionate on the length of the borderline between 
both countries. The infrastructural collapse of the Russian Far East blocks 
development of trade dynamism with Northeast Asia. The Ministry 
of Economic Development of the Russian Federation was supposed to 
coordinate the implementation of the mentioned program in Russia. In 
the short term, the Russian federal government decided to use China to 
solve its own problems and obligations by portraying it as an activity for 
the development of regional cross-border cooperation between Russia 
and China (Assotsiatsiya ekonomicheskogo vzaimodeystviya sub’’yektov 
Rossiyskoy Federatsii „Dal’niy Vostok i Zabaykal’ye”, Informatsiya 
o khode realizatsii Programmy, 2014).
The analysed problem of international activity of federal subjects of the 
Far Eastern Federal District shows that the attitude of regional authorities 
is also important, because they are credited for the failure of this project. 
Anna Madej writes: “The negative attitude of Chinese investors was the 
result of the absence of a mechanism that negotiates the list of projects 
between China and the Ministry of Economic Development of the Russian 
Federation, which is the program coordinator. Individual federal subjects 
are independently and freely changing the list [...]. Moreover, the task 
force for the program implementation, which was established 2 years after 
it was announced, consisted only of regional officials and did not include 
any expert for Chinese affairs. In 2013, the Ministry of the Far East 
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Development was established in Khabarovsk but it did not improve the 
situation – central authorities only obtained greater control to implement 
their plans (but rather its lack of control)” (Madej 2015, 90).
The program’s destiny requires the critical analysis of regional 
authorities capabilities. It also should be asked why the centre did not 
use their significant capabilities to influence governors? The centralized-
coordinative model showed its immaturity. As with other macro-regions, 
it can be said that the Kremlin is not almighty, it makes mistakes and 
does not have managerial staff – it is not effectively enforcing its goals in 
regards to regional policy, the demonstrative dismissals of governors, who 
are accused of sabotaging the centre’s policy or corruption, does not solve 
the long-term problems of regional policy.
4.16. Critical analysis of the centre’s policy to the 
Far East
By analysing the criticism of federal centre’s activities towards the Far 
East regions, it should be emphasized that it has an All-Russian aspect 
(due to the interests of the whole state and/or other regions) and local 
aspect (from perspective of macro-regions interests). However, the thesis 
about the geopolitical approach to development of selected macro-regions 
in the same propagator (N. Zubarevich – M. P., M. S.) elicits doubts. 
When looking at the transfers structure due to the Far East in 
more detail, it can be noticed that financial resources are redistributed 
according to a certain pattern, which has less in common with stimulating 
infrastructural development and acquiring investment, but it has more in 
common with retaining settlement in Northern parts of the Far East at all 
costs. Instead of investing in the development of regions bordering with 
China, the centre expends more funds on the needs of such regions as 
Kamchatka Krai. So, it is not a geopolitical model but “a manual control 
of depopulation threat and confirmation of existing inertia of the Soviet 
policy due to Russian eastern borders” (Zubarevich 2015, 7).
However, considering the creation of 23 “accelerated development 
zones” or TOSER (its Russian acronym, also referred to as TOR) for 
stimulating economic development by way of tax preferences and 
exemptions (DAVE 2016, 6), the federal government is criticized for 
e.g. the absence of establishing clear and permanent investment rules; 
arbitrary and less considered (extremely subjective) selection of regions 
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that have to be included in the program – there are those that are more 
deprived of infrastructure; and concentrating efforts on the development 
of industry branches that are the least competitive, like in the case of the 
Far East – the processing industry due to the highest costs of electricity and 
transport tariff in the whole state. In 2016, from the investors perspective, 
the electricity tariff should be between 29–71% of current prices from 
region to region; in Primorsky Krai kWh cost should be RUB 2.03 not 
RUB 3.38 (Fomicheva 2016; Bashkatova 2016).
It is worth noticing that Russia pinned all its hopes on Chinese 
investors but they have failed. The federal centre, due to the “turn to 
the East” policy, concentrated mostly on cooperation with China with 
all the negative consequences. The share of Chinese direct investments 
in Russia is 1.3% of their total in 2012–2013. In the case of the Far 
East, China is definitely one of the most important investors and trade 
partner.1 Considering the West’s sanction’s conditions and the Kremlin’s 
absolute will to cooperate with China at the expense of South Korea 
and Japan, China has the ability to dictate the cooperation conditions 
(Korostikov 2016). Contrary to the expectations of the federal centre, 
foreign investments are not coming in to the Far East. It is taking place on 
grounds of general regional financial crisis, including investment, in the 
whole Russia and in the Far East.
In 2013–2014, the general level of investment in the region showed 
a declining trend. In 2013, the decline was 20%, in 2014 – 5%. In the first 
quarter of 2015, there was an increase only to foreign investment in the 
gas and oil extraction sectors in Sakhalin Oblast (Zubarevich 2015, 8).
In the case of foreign investment in the macro-region, the situation is 
very confused. There is no doubt that foreign investors, including Chinese 
investors, show quite careful interest in the Far East. The state budget 
(and connected with its Russian companies) is the main investor in region 
but extraction industry is the most attractive.
According to the Central Bank “the investment boom” in macro-
region, which was noticed by Yury Trutnev and Alexander Galushka 
(Grishina 2016), was rather a careful growth. It started in 2014, when the 
annual balance of direct investment in the Far Eastern Federal District 
was USD 3.9 trillion (in 2011, 2012, 2013 was USD 0.95 trillion, USD 
1 China was in 2012 the largest trading partner for the Russian Far East’s border regions 
and the second largest partner (after South Korea) for the Russian Far East macro-
region as a whole (Lee 2012).
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0.56  trillion and USD 1.4 trillion, respectively). In the third quarter of 
2015, the balance of investment exceeded the level from 2014 and was 
USD 4.2 trillion. Interestingly, most foreign investment in the Far Eastern 
Federal District has come recently from offshore (Bahamas, Bermuda, 
Cyprus and the Virgin Islands). It was interpreted as the possible 
investments of the Russian companies (Kryuchkova and Sapozhkov and 
Yedovina 2016).
4.17. The international activity of the Far East’s 
regions due to regional elites
There is a common belief that regions are ignored in the process of 
establishing strategy against the macro-region. Investors use regional tax 
exemptions (ground and estate) and no one consults these decisions with 
regional authorities.
Some of the Far Eastern political and economic scientists criticize 
the centre for subordination of infrastructural plans for cooperation 
with China, which places Russia in the hands of China and their local 
economic situation and deprives Russia from freedom in foreign policy. 
Russia subsidizes its gas trade with China and at the current gas prices, the 
financial requirement for the implementation of “The Strength of Siberia” 
project will not be given back in 30 years, according to Yuriy Moskalenko, 
the Far Eastern economist and publicist. The concentration of efforts to 
deepen cooperation with China is damaging for the economic interests 
of the macro-region. However, it should be noticed that trade with China 
(27%), Japan (25%), and South Korea (25%) also plays an important role 
for this macro-region (Moskalenko 2015a).
Moreover, the centre’s efforts in acquiring investments, even Chinese, 
does not have the expected results. The depopulation process in the Far 
East has been slowed down, however, the number of foreign immigrants 
has been increasing. In 2005 the increase of migration was 3.3% of the 
total people migrating to the macro-region but in 2014 it was 12.8% 
(Kryuchkova and Sapozhkov and Yedovina 2016).
Moskalenko, generalizing a little bit, indicated that the most serious 
issue, which the Far East and its inhabitants have in common, is only 
the federal centre, which is not able to solve its structural issues, 
because the  federal elite concentrates on geopolitical competition and 
preserving power. “The Far East, just like other Russian regions, needs 
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real not declaratory federalism,” as the abovementioned Amur was 
quoted saying. Now, as before, the Kremlin instrumentally uses the 
macro-region and does not allow the development of independent and 
local entrepreneurship and ignores the interests of the local community 
(Moskalenko 2015b).
The significant problem from the point of (not) increasing the 
level of internationalization of the macro-region (evident in the case 
of limited investment growth in macro-region, which is noticed only 
in Magadan Oblast and Sakhalin Oblast) is tax policy. More generally 
the problems are: the adverse investment approach, which is common 
in Russia, the criminalization of economic life (especially fishing and 
wood industry) and finally, the extreme politicization of principles of the 
local government functioning in Russia, especially in Primorsky Krai and 
Vladivostok (Samokhina and Sergeyev 2016). The endless reshuffling of 
the Mayor of Vladivostok, who officially has connections with corruption/
mismanagement/exceeding the authorities, but in practice – the 
continuous struggle between the Governors of Primorsky Krai and Mayors 
of Vladivostok that started at the beginning of 1990s, makes regional 
authorities hardly credible to investors (Zheleznova 2016).
The results of an in depth interview (survey later in the text), which 
was conducted due to the perception of paradiplomacy (international 
activity) in the macro-region of the Far East by the authors with 
representatives of local administrative and academic elites, provides 
interesting knowledge for this topic.2 The knowledge attained provides 
confirmation of previous observations on the basis of analysis of scientific 
literature and press. The research has been accomplished thanks to the 
use of Alexander Kusnetsov’s research matrix. First, the questions were 
only related to the situation in regions of the Russian Far East, secondly, 
the term of paradiplomacy was understood as diplomatic activity of 
regional authorities and their international activity. The participants 
of the research have answered the questions, however, they were able to 
treat them as open questions.
The first question concerned the cause of development of international 
activity. From many various answers, respondents mostly indicated that 
border location is an essential motive of international cooperation and 
provides support to it. Globalization processes were often indicated as 
natural and objective conditions of development of regional international 
2 Interviews were held between 2015–2016 with 12 people.
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cooperation. All the rest were extremely rare, however, regionalization 
processes and external incentives can be distinguished.
The question about the legal basis of regional international activity 
consisted of two parts: the first part concerned the level of negotiations 
between the federal government and regional authorities, the second part 
tackled the problem of legal determinants for negotiations with regional 
authorities, if the project of international cooperation was related to 
regions.
In the case of the first issue, the most common answers indicated that 
the level of negotiations between federal and regional authorities is not 
sufficient. Some respondents assumed that there is strict control by the 
centre and regional international activity completely depends on interests 
or is controlled from above and “great international projects” that include 
regions must be reconciled between regional and central authorities.
Considering the second part about legal determinants for negotiations 
with regional authorities, if the project concerned international cooperation 
that includes regions, respondents seemed to be surprised at being asked 
such questions – the awareness of existing similar solutions must be low. 
They do not know, they have no idea, they cannot answer or they do not 
have information on that subject – these are the most common answers.
Considering the main reasons (motives) that lie at the heart of 
establishing international cooperation by regional authorities the 
vast majority of respondents indicated economic motives or cross-
border location, which had to be a natural condition of regional 
internationalization. The political or cultural cooperation motives were 
of minimum importance.
Putting the problem of institutionalization of paradiplomacy of the Far 
East regions was an excellent opportunity to become better informed about 
the main international cooperation channels with the outside. Respondents 
mostly indicated the vital importance of such endeavours: exhibitions and 
forums. The important communication channel, deduced on the basis 
of answers, were official visits of regional authorities abroad or finally, 
participation in the activities of the official delegations of the Russian 
government. Surprisingly, a significantly lower role is attributed to both 
domestic institutions, which are specialized in such activities (Regional 
Minister of Foreign Affairs, permanent representation in foreign states) and 
th structure of international cooperation (global and trans-border networks).
The issue of paradiplomacy due to interests of the whole state and 
the connected issue of forming a model of centre-regions relations due 
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to international cooperation of the latter, did not trigger problems in the 
surveyed representatives of administrative and academic elites of the macro-
region. The answers correspond with their previous answers concerning 
the dependence between the federal centre’s policy and regional activities. 
The general feeling is that paradiplomacy is a “common issue,” a chance 
for development of the whole state. However, considering the relation 
model, the majority of respondents indicated on the internationalization 
of the coordinated-cooperative model or coordinated-joint activities 
model that they accepted as appropriate that international activity of 
federal subjects is coordinated by the centre both formally and informally 
and they themselves take part in the implementation of Russian foreign 
policy. There were also suggestions, which confirm the general feeling, that 
regional international activity depends on the current political situation 
and “Moscow’s” interests.
The last issue concerned the consequences of implementation 
international activity by regions. The internationalization of federal subjects 
of the Russian Federation did not trigger any threats that it will cause the 
dissolution of the state due to increasing separatism trends. This problem 
does not exist in the minds of the governing bodies and researchers of the 
problem on regional level. Paradiplomacy had to foster the democratization 
of rules in taking state decisions into the international cooperation area and 
further general regionalization of Russian foreign policy.
4.18. Conclusions
Analysing forms, conditions and frequency of international 
cooperation of federal subjects of the Russian Federation in historical-
comparative view, it should be emphasized that:
– conditions of international cooperation will become more and 
more determined by economic conditions but will be less determined by 
political (geopolitical, ethno-political, personal-ambitious) conditions;
– regions extensively use state support in the process of sustaining 
international cooperation;
– there is still deep diversification in the socio-economic development 
of Russia, some regions despite its potential and geo-economic attractive 
position are not able to use it in international cooperation.
The internal environment has been diametrically changing 
(centralization of federal relations), it has impact on trends and forms of 
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regional international cooperation in Russia after 2000. After this date, 
the federal centre is important and unusually active – comparing to the 
previous decade – it became a moderator of socio-political, economic, 
and regional international activity changes in Russia. As a result, further 
research on the internationalization phenomenon of the Russian regions 
should be implemented with the use of the state centric paradigm. 
The internationalization of regions that is viewed through the prism of 
the “realism” trend in federal officials’ minds, which is adapted to the needs 
of Russian domestic policy, provides the answer why it is consistently 
owned by federal centre. This process has pros and cons from the Russian 
statehood perspective; the pros are coordination and orderliness of the 
sometimes chaotic regional paradiplomacy, and supporting regions that 
need state assistance; the cons are division of cooperation trends for good 
(China, CIS) and for bad (Western Europe), blocking development of cross-
border (trans-border) cooperation. 
At the moment, we are facing the process of institutionalization 
of the centralized-coordinative model due to regional international 
cooperation in Russia. This term fully reflects the character of relations, 
which have been in creation in Russia since 2000 due to the regional 
internationalization and federal centre’s policy towards this phenomenon. 
Referring to Soldatos’ concept mentioned in Kusnetsov’s research matrix: 
cooperative-coordinated and cooperative-joint, the Russian model (clearly 
seen in the case of the Far East) is an amalgamation of both. The federal 
subjects international activity is coordinated by the centre both formally 
and informally, they themselves are included in the implementation 
of the Russian foreign policy. It should be emphasized that there is 
a constitutional-legal basis of this model.
It can be assumed that interlacement of classical models of centre-regions 
relations in the case of paradiplomacy is expressed on the level of perception 
of regional international activity from the whole state interests’ perspective. 
The federal centre influenced by the negative experiences from the 1990s, 
in which there was the uncontrolled development of regional international 
cooperation, (often against the official position from the federal government) 
sees paradiplomacy as a threat to Russia. However, this threat may be 
eliminated and become an asset, if regional activity in the international area 
is skilfully coordinated with the centre’s policy and/or regions are indirectly or 
directly included in the implementation of Russian foreign policy.
The federal centre’s approach to autonomy, including international 
activity of federal subjects of the Russian Federation, resulting in forming 
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a centralized-coordinated model, may be viewed through the prism of 
existing theories in international relations. In this sense the forming of the 
mentioned model of centre-regions relations is an example of realism’s 
“triumph” in Russia, after 1999. The presence of realism in the case of the 
analysed issue, i.e. Kremlin’s attitude to regional international activity, 
comes into play in all aspects of the analysed phenomenon at both the 
conceptual level (due to the concept of location and role of regions in 
the strategy of development of the Russian foreign policy) and practical 
level (the way of using regions and their international contacts by the 
centre to promote Russian national interests).
The nature of the Russian political system corresponds with the nature 
of centre-regions relations: Yeltsin’s anocracy period – i.e. polity, where 
elections were utilized in order to maintain the pretence of legitimacy, 
but the political leader is forced to obtain resources from various 
political and economic elites, in order to maintain power (Schofield and 
Gallego 2001, 17) – corresponded with asymmetrical federalism. Putin’s 
electoral authoritarianism is harmoniously compatible with the unitary 
federalism. This also applies to the regional international activity model, 
the decentralized model dominated before 2000 and since that year the 
centralized model started its consolidation. The authoritarian nature 
of the Russian political system (not of many regions) in the 1990s was 
not and is still not a barrier in the development of regional international 
activity.
The Russian regions due to the realization of the concept of centralized 
federal relations (de-federalization) receive less autonomy in the decision-
making process. Regional political elites have been politically pressured 
by the Kremlin – they have been “squeezed into the straightjackets” of 
a vertical power structure and operate in the strict institutional-legal 
frames considering their participation in international economic trade 
and international cooperation. The federal centre has an open tendency 
to use regions instrumentally in the process of realizing its goals in foreign 
policy, sometimes, however, to their mutual benefit.
Federal elites, under Vladimir Putin’s governance and despite formal 
subordination of regions to centre, still (irrationally) suspiciously look at 
regional elites and picture them as a threat to their domination in the 
political system or look at them in fear of increasing separatism trends. 
They do so due to the experiences from the 1990s, when actions of some 
regions resulted in the dissolution of the uniformed political-legal area of 
the Russian Federation. Additionally, their specific approach to the concept 
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of sovereignty formed by domestic political experiences, “expansion 
policy to the East” of European political-economic structures (the EU), 
political-military structures (NATO), penetration of the post-Soviet area 
by the USA (Membership Action Plan), and the EU (Eastern Partnership) 
further fuel their suspicions. The centralization of federal relations in 
legal and political areas were accompanied by an anti-Western vector 
in Russian foreign policy, which was developed gradually but resolutely. 
However, the Russian federal elite was successively joined by individuals 
who represented a specific type of strategic culture that affirms ideas of 
indivisible sovereignty of the nation state, which perceive globalization/
glocalization as a source of threats to national interests of Russia or 
national security and search bad intentions in players who get involved in 
cooperation with regions.
The process of internationalization of the Far East regions (or rather 
to be precise the pattern of relations between regions and centre) seems 
to be perfectly suited in a certain model of centre-regions relations in the 
international activity area of the latter in the whole state. 
Taking into consideration the level of internationalization of the Far 
East regions, it can be seen that they diverge from other macro-regions as 
a result of their concluding international agreements, which is logically 
connected with a low level of international economic cooperation. The 
low level of internationalization of the macro-region is not an anomaly 
but results from general regularities that increase the internationalization 
level of the Russian North-western and Central regions in a natural way. 
They are connected with direct proximity of the macro-region in both 
geo-economic and political-historical areas. As it was shown in case of 
the Far East regions, with the highest level of internationalization they 
benefit from their natural resources: gas, fish, timber, border status, and 
vicinity of the rapidly developing Chinese economy. So, their successes 
are determined economically and geographically. 
Taking into consideration the conditions of establishing international 
cooperation, it can be seen that there was a significant change due to the 
1990s. In the past, acquiring essential resources for the functioning of 
local economies and providing decent living standards (resulting in the 
development of the “grey zone”) were the main issues to fulfil. Nowadays, 
the exploitation of natural resources and boosting nature of the centre’s 
policy, which usually has an instrumental nature, play an important 
role. The instrumentalism in the federal centre’s approach to regional 
international activity in conjunction with the centralization of the system 
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of federal relations and with the centre’s clear activity due to forming 
regional international cooperation allows to formulate a thesis that in the 
Far East the centralized-coordinative model exists.
It should be assumed that activities of federal authorities within 
the so-called geopolitically-oriented Far Eastern regional policy, which 
includes involvement of regions in international activity, give interesting 
information about (in-)effectiveness of this kind of policy. The geopolitical 
approach to regional policy in the case of the Russian Far East intertwined 
with the instrumental approach to forming regional international 
cooperation – have not produced the expected results.
The Kremlin’s policy towards the Far East does not improve the socio-
economic requirement of the macro-region and in addition, it activates 
criticism in the region, deepens alienation and confirms the inhabitants’ 
beliefs that there is a colonial approach to the Far East, i.e. the excessive 
exploitation of the macro-region without any concern for the living 
conditions of its inhabitants. The centre’s actions improve the level of 
regional internationalization, however, the process is mostly connected 
with: 1) export of fossil fuels or the broad export of resources (wood, 
fish); or 2) actions of the Russian Federation in the international area 
and involvement of regions in state foreign policy. What is even worse, 
the federal centre while trying to form a regional international activity 
– in the framework of the centralized-coordinative model – cannot control 
their actions. Secondly, by implementing “great projects,” it marginalizes 
the opinions and interests of regions. The centralized-coordinative model 
is consolidated neither in the Far East macro-region nor in the whole 
country. It is connected with problems which the centre faces during 
the implementation of personnel policy in regions, political conflicts in 
provinces and general weakness in affecting the socio-political processes 
in regions.
Despite the centre’s great advantage over regions in available resources 
and due to the established formal-legal rules of operating federal relations, 
regional elites have power with which centre authorities must take into 
account in the negative aspect (sabotaging the centre’s policy/inability to 
implement it) and in the positive aspect (mobilization of “administrative 
resources” during election campaigns, which are important for the 
Kremlin). Some of the strongest regions use this situation in their favour, 
other regions, which are deprived of political and economic assets but 
have positive experiences in cooperation with Western countries in the 
1990s, try in every possible way to defend their autonomy. All this makes 
Małgorzata Pietrasiak, Michał Słowikowski202
that centralized-cooperative model is not internally consistent and thereby 
consolidated. The international activity of the Far East regions shows that 
centralized-cooperative model has many gaps.
Looking back at the international activity of the Russian regions, after 
2000, regarding its impact on the Russian statehood, it is alarming that 
in some cases the centralized-cooperative model of actions of regions may 
be extremely unfavourable for regions. In a wider view, its consolidation 
may result in a challenge for the stability of the Russian political system. 
As it stands, it generates dissatisfaction and protest sentiments in regions 
that are mostly interested in international cooperation – which is one of 
the significant sources of socio-economic development for them. Forms 
of international cooperation enforced by the Kremlin have not produced 
the expected results. The experience of international activity of regions 
of the Russian Far East or broadly Russia-China economic cooperation, 
which had to substitute economic contacts between Russia and the West 
after 2014, are the best examples (Korstikov 2016).
The experiences of the 1990s in regional international activity 
strengthened the feeling of urgency in the orderliness of the centre-regions 
relations for the sake of the development of Russian statehood. However, 
the “fruits” of international cooperation, which are the involvement of 
the Russian regions after 2000 (including the Far East), argue that the 
centralization of federal relations blatantly harms Russian statehood, 
Russian international profile, interests of regions and federal subjects, 
ordinary citizens and the stability of authoritarian system, established 
around Vladimir Putin.
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